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FEDERAL IMMIGRATION DETAINERS AFTER
ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
Christopher N. Lasch*
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court held that three of
the four challenged provisions to Arizona’s “Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” were preempted. The Court
reached this conclusion by focusing on the federal government’s
supremacy in immigration enforcement. Ironically, the Court’s focus on
federal supremacy undermines the executive branch’s central
enforcement measure for obtaining custody of suspected immigration
violators: immigration detainers.
The executive branch issues over a quarter million immigration
detainers each year to state and local law officials. These detainers
command state and local officials to hold a prisoner, who would
otherwise be released, in custody awaiting pickup by federal
immigration officials. This Article examines the immigration detainer
program under the analytical framework provided by the Court’s
Arizona decision. This Article proceeds by first describing the Arizona
decision and its underlying analytical framework. It then analyzes
immigration detainers within this framework, concluding that the
federal immigration detainer regulation is ultra vires and raises
substantial constitutional questions. Ultimately, this Article shows that
the Arizona decision will have significant impact on immigration
enforcement beyond the question of allocation of enforcement authority
between the federal government and state and local governments.

* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School;
A.B., Columbia College. My thanks go to the editors for inviting me to participate in this
Supreme Court review. I am also indebted to the following people who provided helpful
suggestions and insights along the way, though of course any problems that remain are my own:
Deborah Bergman, Patience Crowder, Annie Lai, Nantiya Ruan, Paromita Shah, Giovanna Shay,
Robin Walker Sterling, and Michael J. Wishnie. The Article also benefitted from a workshop held
at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law as part of the Rocky Mountain Junior
Scholars Forum, and I am grateful to the University of Denver for sending me to participate in the
Forum. Finally, I wish to thank John Galligan for his helpful research assistance and Christopher
Linas for his masterful editing.
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“This is not the system Congress created.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration law always implicates civil rights,2 and the past
twenty years have seen an increasing importance for immigration as
a major civil rights battleground.3 A perceived immigration crisis4
intensified the heat of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant sentiment
and brought immigration federalism issues from a simmer to a full
boil. Those seeking more vigorous immigration enforcement and
those seeking an expansion of immigrant rights alike attacked federal
immigration policy as a failed endeavor.5 Both groups sought change
at the state and local levels, but through radically different programs.
Anti-immigrant groups persuaded some state and local governments
to pass measures supplementing federal immigration enforcement
efforts6—purportedly grounded in the “inherent authority” of state
sovereign governments to regulate immigration. Meanwhile
immigrants’ rights advocates, decrying federal enforcement
measures tainted by racial profiling and constitutionally suspect
home and workplace raids, lobbied local governments to disentangle

1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
2. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 1 (2004) (“[T]he U.S. government’s treatment of immigrants is inextricably linked to the
efforts of domestic minorities to secure civil rights.”).
3. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 638 (2012) (“Immigration is one of the dominant civil rights
issues of the twenty-first century. The recent spate of state and local efforts seeking to regulate
immigration demonstrate this basic truth.”).
4. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1994) (“Rising American concern over a perceived immigration
crisis makes it a virtual certainty that courts will once again grapple with questions concerning the
meaning and significance of alienage as a legal status category.”); María Pabón López,
Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1373–74 (2005) (“Census 2000 highlighted the reality of the
increased number of noncitizens in the country, particularly Latinos, and has precipitated a
renewal of nationwide concern over an ‘immigration crisis.’”) (citations omitted).
5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 615–17.
6. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing local anti-immigrant measures
such as those passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania); infra note 46 (discussing state legislative
measures).
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state and local law enforcement from federal immigration
enforcement,7 resist cooperation, and create “sanctuary cities.”8
The Court’s June 25, 2012, decision in Arizona v. United States9
marked, in part,10 the end of the story of one such local effort:
Arizona’s “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act,” colloquially known simply as “S.B. 1070,”11 enacted at the
behest of anti-immigration lobbyists frustrated by what they believed
to be the federal government’s failure to sufficiently enforce the
Nation’s immigration laws. Hailed as a landmark decision of historic
proportions,12 Arizona struck down three of the four challenged
sections of S.B. 1070.13 Two of the three provisions struck down
created state crimes to punish immigrants for not carrying federally
required registration documents14 and for seeking work without
authorization;15 the third provision expanded state arrest authority to
allow police to arrest suspected immigration violators.16 The Court
7. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text (discussing state and local resistance to
federal immigration enforcement).
8. A sanctuary city may be characterized as one in which local law “limit[s] government
employees, particularly local police officers, from inquiring or disseminating information about
the immigration status of immigrants whom they encounter.” Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a
‘Sanctuary’?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008). San Francisco describes its “City and County of
Refuge” ordinance in similar terms, connecting its ordinance to both the faith-based sanctuary
movement of the 1980s and the post-9/11 “New Sanctuary Movement.” Sanctuary Ordinance,
CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1067 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); see
also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382–91 (2006) (discussing the sanctuary
movement of the 1980s and the post-9/11 sanctuary resurgence).
9. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
10. Because the Court only addressed a facial challenge to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, and
expressly reserved the possibility of future “as applied” challenges, see infra notes 197–201,
continued litigation over S.B. 1070 is likely. See infra notes 246, 374–376 and accompanying
text.
11. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (West) [hereinafter
S.B. 1070].
12. E.g., How the Supreme Court Ruled on SB 1070 and What It Means for Other States,
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 25, 2012), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom
/release/how-supreme-court-ruled-sb-1070-and-what-it-means-other-states; John King, USA,
CNN (June 25, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1206/25/jkusa.01.html (CNN
commentator John King describing the Arizona decision as a “landmark decision”).
13. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2494–97.
14. S.B. 1070 § 3; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2010) (discussed below, see infra
Part II.C.1.a).
15. S.B. 1070 § 5(C); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (discussed below, see infra Part
II.C.1.b).
16. S.B. 1070 § 2(E); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (discussed below, see infra
Part II.C.1.c).
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held that these legislative efforts were preempted by comprehensive
federal regulation of immigration enforcement.17 The Court
additionally left open the possibility that the fourth challenged
provision, requiring Arizona police officers to run immigration status
checks on suspected immigration violators,18 might be held
unconstitutional or preempted, depending on how the law is actually
applied.19
The failure of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and the particular way it
failed, has dramatically important consequences for the future of
immigration enforcement. Arizona certainly tipped the balance in
favor of federal enforcement and away from state and local
enforcement. But this Article explores a less obvious consequence of
Arizona: its implications for the continuing viability of a critical
federal enforcement mechanism, the immigration detainer.
An immigration detainer is a piece of paper issued by
immigration officials that purports to command other law
enforcement officials to hold a prisoner, who otherwise would be
released, in custody and deliver that person to federal immigration
officials.20 State and local officials regularly comply with
immigration detainers by continuing to hold prisoners whom they
would otherwise release.21 Federal enforcement programs like the
highly controversial Secure Communities22 depend on the
immigration detainer as their key enforcement mechanism. The
Arizona decision saps the vitality out of this mechanism and exposes
it as far exceeding any congressional grant of authority and as
conflicting with the Fourth Amendment principles discussed in the
Court’s opinion.23
17. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
18. S.B. 1070 § 2(B); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (discussed below, see infra Part
II.C.1.d).
19. Because the Court permitted Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 to stand, the story of S.B. 1070 is
not entirely over.
20. The federal immigration detainer is discussed more fully below. See infra Part III.A.
21. Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173–74 (2008). Since I wrote in 2008, a
wave of localities has begun to resist immigration detainers, as I discuss below. See infra notes
41–42 and accompanying text.
22. This program is discussed below. See infra notes 262–273 and accompanying text.
23. This Article focuses only on the impact of Arizona upon the validity of the federal
immigration detainer regulation. Discussion of the impact of Arizona on state and local
enforcement of immigration detainers is outside the scope of this Article. But Arizona suggests
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I begin in Part II with a discussion of the context in which S.B.
1070 was passed, a brief history of the litigation over S.B. 1070, and
the Arizona decision. The ongoing civil rights battle over
immigration brought to the fore issues of racial profiling and the
debate over whether states possess “inherent authority” to enforce
immigration laws. Arizona failed to put these issues to rest, and the
Court’s silence ensures ongoing controversy and litigation. Digesting
the Arizona opinion, I address in turn (1) the majority’s preemption
analysis (and its failure to address the civil rights issues) with respect
to the four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070; (2) the Fourth
Amendment discussion among the Justices, attendant to the question
of whether state officials may subject suspected immigration
violators to prolonged detention; and (3) the omission by the
Justices—except for Justice Scalia—of any discussion of a state’s
“inherent authority” or police power with respect to immigration
enforcement.
The remainder of the Article assesses the effect Arizona will
have on the federal government’s use of immigration detainers to
obtain custody over prisoners held by other law enforcement
agencies. Ironically, while Arizona trumpets the supremacy of the
federal government in the field of immigration, the opinion has
negative implications for the federal government’s central
enforcement mechanism for obtaining custody of suspected
immigration violators. The legality of the immigration detainer
system put in place by the executive branch can be analyzed through
the same doctrinal frames seen in Arizona—preemption and the
Fourth Amendment concerns with prolonged detention.
I proceed to that analysis in Part III, addressing Arizona’s impact
on federal authority to issue immigration detainers requiring other
law enforcement officials to prolong the detention of their prisoners.
I conclude that the detainer regulation purporting to allow this is
ultra vires for the same reason the Arizona Court held parts of S.B.
1070 preempted—the executive branch’s detainer regulation is flatly
inconsistent with the comprehensive enforcement regime established
that absent any federal authority for detaining suspected immigration violators, state and local
officials may lack the authority to detain. Indeed, the states may lack any police power
whatsoever regarding immigration, and alternatively, what police power the states do possess
may have been preempted by comprehensive federal immigration control.
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by Congress. Additionally, there are substantial Fourth Amendment
problems with the immigration detainer regulation that Arizona’s
Fourth Amendment discussion illuminates. The regulation is invalid
because of these substantial constitutional questions.24
II. S.B. 1070 AND THE ARIZONA DECISION
In this part, I briefly discuss the divergent solutions local
communities adopted in response to perceived immigration crises
since the 1990s and the criticism of the federal government’s
enforcement programs by both pro- and anti-immigrant advocacy
groups. I then discuss Arizona’s adoption of S.B. 1070 and
“copycat” legislation passed elsewhere. Next, I summarize briefly
the course of the litigation over S.B. 1070 and conclude with a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s June 25, 2012, decision in
Arizona v. United States.
A. Immigration and Immigration Detainers
as Civil Rights Issues
Recent disappointment with the federal government’s handling
of immigration enforcement25 dates back at least to the 1980s,26
when the government’s continued deportations of Guatemalan and
Salvadoran refugees spawned the “sanctuary movement.” The
“sanctuary movement” saw private and religious organizations come
forward in opposition to federal policy to provide sanctuary to
refugees.27 In turn, the movement spurred some localities to pass
24. As discussed briefly below, see infra Part III.C.2, although the Tenth Amendment was
not discussed in the Arizona decision, there are substantial Tenth Amendment concerns raised by
the detainer regulation.
25. State and local desire to outpace federal immigration enforcement is of course not a new
phenomenon. E.g., Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien”
Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905,
911–14 (2011) (discussing state and local legislation in 1870s and 1880s California aimed at
repelling the “invasion of the subjects of the Mongolian empire”). Indeed, the Arizona Court
relied extensively on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), which arose after Pennsylvania
enacted alien registration statutes that went further than their federal counterparts.
26. While I hope to provide useful examples to demonstrate the civil rights battle that has
been ongoing in recent decades, a complete historical survey is far beyond the scope of this
Article. For a recounting of the history I only briefly allude to here, see Gerald P. López, Don’t
We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1773–98 (2011).
27. Christopher Carlberg, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an Effective
Uniform Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
740, 743–45 (2009).
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legislation disentangling local from federal immigration policy.
Ultimately, four states and twenty-three localities passed some form
of sanctuary resolution or law in the 1980s.28
An opposite prevailing sentiment was exemplified by the story
of Proposition 187. In 1994 California voters responded to a
plunging economy by focusing on undocumented immigrants from
Mexico. Proposition 187 barred illegal immigrants from receiving
government benefits and required California officials to report them
to federal immigration officials.29 Proposition 187 was intended to
“send a message” to a federal government Californians felt had failed
adequately to address immigration.30 The rhetoric of the Proposition
187 campaign was replete with anti-Mexican invective that raised
obvious civil rights concerns.31 A federal court ultimately struck
down the initiative as preempted.32
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the federal government
actively sought to enlist state and local cooperation in immigration
enforcement. In 2002, a memorandum from the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opined that “the authority to
arrest for violation of federal law inheres in the States, subject only
to preemption by federal law.”33 The “inherent authority” trumpeted
by the 2002 OLC memo derived from the “States’ status as sovereign
entities.”34 For state officers to arrest a person for a claimed violation
of federal law (even civil immigration law) was, according to the
logic of the 2002 OLC memo, an exercise of sovereign power akin to
that exercised by Canadian Mounties arresting a fugitive from U.S.
28. Id.; Pham, supra note 8, at 1383. The federal government responded by enacting federal
legislation prohibiting states and localities from preventing communication between their
employees and federal immigration officials. Id. at 1384–85.
29. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
30. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 629, 633 (1995); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786 (“The
California voters’ overwhelming approval of Proposition 187 reflects their justifiable frustration
with the federal government’s inability to enforce the immigration laws effectively.”).
31. Johnson, supra note 30, at 654–58, 660–61.
32. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786. Kevin Johnson had accurately
predicted that “a much-debated aspect of the passage of Proposition 187—that it is nativistic and
racist—in all probability will never be decided by the courts.” Johnson, supra note 30, at 672.
33. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John
Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen. 1 (Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 OLC Memorandum], available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
34. Id. at 2.
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justice.35 Police in both cases exercised “inherent authority,” not
delegated authority.36
Those on both sides of the immigration civil rights divide were
entrenched on the issue of “inherent authority.” Critics believed state
and local participation in enforcement would lead to racial profiling
and would force immigrants into the shadows, discouraging
immigrants from availing themselves of police and other social
services.37 Some other concerns include perceived excesses of the
federal antiterrorism effort38 and community outrage at immigration
enforcement tactics and constitutional violations attendant to
workplace and home raids.39 The result has been a resurgence of the
sanctuary movement,40 on both the local level (where “sanctuary
cities” like New Haven, Connecticut, and San Francisco, California,
have enacted local ordinances that prohibit police from inquiring into
immigration status)41 and the state level.42
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. E.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085–88 (2004). For a more complete list of scholars who criticized the
2002 OLC memo and the “inherent authority” argument, see López, supra note 26, at 1785 n.196.
38. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1250–61 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting LopezMendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1126–40 (arguing constitutional violations attendant to
immigration enforcement had become “both geographically widespread—ranging widely across
geographical boundaries—and institutionally widespread—the result of behavior by lawenforcement officers operating at the federal, state and local levels”); Bill Ong Hing, Institutional
Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 307 (2009) (discussing
workplace raids).
40. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of
Good Policing and Good Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 306 (2012); Pham, supra note 8, at
1387–91 (detailing post-9/11 “sanctuary” enactments).
41. See generally Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1475–78 (2006) (exploring various rationales behind
local sanctuary laws); Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 600–05 (2008) (discussing local sanctuary laws). Both New
Haven and San Francisco have adopted municipal identification card programs that allow
participation without regard for immigration status. Jeff Holtz, This Summer’s Surprise Hit: An
Elm City ID, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at O6; Jennifer Medina, New Haven Approves Program
to Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at B6; Javier Erik Olvera, S.F. to Issue
ID Cards to Illegal Immigrants: City Becomes Only the Second in Nation after New Haven,
Conn., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.mercurynews.com/politics
/ci_7522078?nclick_check=1.
42. Oregon, for example, enacted legislation attempting to disentangle the state from federal
immigration enforcement:
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But not all post-9/11 measures have been aimed at reducing state
and local involvement in immigration. Advocates of local
enforcement, expressing dissatisfaction with the federal
government’s failure to enforce immigration law more vigorously,
succeeded in passing a host of local measures enlisting local officials
in enforcement. Among the most notorious were those adopted in
Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Escondido, California; Riverside, New
Jersey; and Farmers Branch, Texas.43 These ordinances generally
seek to prevent undocumented immigrants from obtaining
employment or housing in a community, as well as to punish citizens
for harboring the undocumented.44 On the statewide level, as will be
discussed in detail below,45 Arizona led the way with S.B. 1070,
authored by the most prominent advocate of the inherent authority
argument.46
Civil rights issues pervade not only the discussion about federal,
state, and local enforcement but also the debate over federal
immigration detainers. Detainers, discussed more fully below,47 are a
mechanism for transferring the custody of state and local prisoners
suspected of immigration violations to federal immigration
authorities. In the last few years, compliance with immigration
detainers has emerged as one litmus test for assessing where a
locality stands in the immigration civil rights debate.48

No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision of
the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of
detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal
immigration laws.
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1) (2012).
43. Daniel Eduardo Guzmán, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing
Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405–13 (2010)
(discussing these ordinances and the litigation challenging them).
44. Id.
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181–83 (2006); López, supra
note 26, at 1811 (identifying Kobach as the “S.B. 1070’s architect”).
47. See infra Part III.A.
48. See Adam Sorensen, Obama’s Next Immigration Battle: Local, Federal Authorities on
Collision Course over Detention, TIME: SWAMPLAND (July 16, 2012), http://swampland.time
.com/2012/07/16/obamas-next-immigration-battle-local-federal-authorities-on-collision-courseover-detention-requests/#ixzz283daq9sC.
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Detainers implicate civil rights concerns in several ways. People
arrested for minor offenses, including traffic violations, have become
the targets of immigration detainers—in turn raising a concern that
the detainer “tail” will wag the street-level enforcement “dog” and
encourage racial profiling by police.49 Additionally, a lack of
investigation and reliance on flawed databases has reportedly led to
U.S. citizens being held pursuant to detainers.50 And numerous
lawsuits have been brought alleging “overdetention” of prisoners
based on immigration detainers.51
Various “sanctuary” ordinances have been passed aiming to
reduce compliance with detainers. As is discussed in further detail
below, one state and numerous counties and cities have enacted
antidetainer legislation.52
B. The Passage of S.B. 1070
and Ensuing Litigation
At the state level, Arizona was determined to lead the way by
enacting legislation that would engage state law enforcement fully in
the immigration enforcement effort. In April 2010, Arizona’s
49. See Trevor Gardener II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE
Criminal Alien Program, THE CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY &
DIVERSITY POLICY BRIEF, Sept. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files
/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (observing correlation between issuance of detainers and profiling
of Latinos in Irving, Texas).
50. See Molly F. Franck, Unlawful Arrests and Over-Detention of America’s Immigrants:
What the Federal Government Can Do to Eliminate State and Local Abuse of Immigration
Detainers, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 55, 65 (2011) (reporting 5 percent of individuals
targeted for immigration enforcement through the “Secure Communities” program between
October 2008 and October 2009 were U.S. citizens); Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also
Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A20. See also Henry v. Chertoff, 317 F. App’x
178, 179 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing habeas petition alleging prisoner subject to immigration
detainer was a U.S. citizen); Complaint, Vohra v. United States, No. SA CV 04-00972 DSF (RZ)
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) (alleging plaintiff was a U.S. citizen held pursuant to immigration
detainer); Brian Bennett, Fingerprinting Program Ensnares U.S. Citizen; He’s Suing the FBI and
Homeland Security After Being Flagged as an Illegal Immigrant and Held in Prison, L.A. TIMES,
July 6, 2012, at A9 (describing U.S. citizen’s claim that he was wrongfully detained for two
months due to database error).
51. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, QUICK INFORMATION ON IMMIGRATION DETAINERS
(Mar. 2011), available at http://immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2010
/DetainersBackgrounder.pdf (detailing cases of overdetention); see also Franck, supra note 50, at
79 (characterizing overdetention as not infrequent); Feds Pay $50k Settlement to ACLU Client,
ACLU COLO. (May 3, 2011), http://aclu-co.org/news/feds-pay-50k-settlement-to-aclu-client
(detailing a 47-day overdetention incident).
52. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text.
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governor signed into law the now infamous S.B. 1070. 53 The law
essentially deputized Arizona police in the enforcement of federal
immigration law. The intent of the legislation was overtly
exclusionary:
The legislature finds that there is a compelling
interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to
make attrition through enforcement the public policy
of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.
The provisions of this act are intended to work
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry
and presence of aliens and economic activity by
persons unlawfully present in the United States.54
Among the provisions of S.B. 1070 were those ultimately
challenged in Arizona v. United States:
1) Section 2(B) requires Arizona officers who stop or detain a
person to investigate immigration status “where reasonable
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully
present in the United States.”55 Section 2(B) requires the
officer to make a “reasonable attempt” to ascertain the
person’s immigration status. If an arrest is made, the officer
“shall have the person’s immigration status determined
before the person is released.”56
2) Section 3 makes “willful failure to complete or carry an
alien registration document” in violation of federal law a
state misdemeanor.57 The sentencing court may not suspend
or probate the jail sentence imposed for this offense.58
3) Section 5(C) makes it a state misdemeanor “for a person
who is unlawfully present in the United States and who is an
unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work
53. See ‘Show Your Papers’ Arizona Immigration Provision Survives As Court Rejects Bid
to Have It Blocked, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 25, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/09/26/show-your-papers-arizona_n_1914678.html.
54. S.B. 1070 § 1, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2011).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 13-1509.
58. Id.
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in a public place or perform work as an employee or
independent contractor in [Arizona].”59
4) Section 6 authorizes Arizona police officers to make a
warrantless arrest of any person “if the officer has probable
cause to believe [the person] has committed any public
offense that makes the person removable from the United
States.”60
After the passage of S.B. 1070, copycat legislation proliferated
the following year,61 with states vying with one another to be the
toughest on immigrants.62
Advocacy groups responded immediately to S.B. 1070’s
enactment by filing five separate lawsuits in April and May 2010.63
These lawsuits generally alleged that S.B. 1070 was motivated by
racial bias and would result in racial profiling.64 Meanwhile, regular
59. Id. § 13-2928(C).
60. Id. § 13-3883(A)(5).
61. For a summary of legislative measures and how they fared, see National Copycat
Landscape, MISS. IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS ALLIANCE (July 5, 2011), http://www.yourmira.org/
2011/07/05/national-copycat-landscape, and SB 1070 Copycats: Arizona-Related Legislative
Developments, NAT’L COUNCIL LA RAZA, http://www.nclr.org/index.php/issues_and_programs
/immigration/state_local_immigration_initiatives/arizona-related_legislative_developments/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (indicating which states rejected or passed Arizona-copycat bills in the
2010 and 2011 legislative session).
62. Robbie Brown, Georgia Gives Police Added Power to Seek Out Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A12 (describing Georgia’s new law as “one of the nation’s toughest
immigration measures”); Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Strict Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES,
June 10, 2011, at A8.
63. See Complaint, Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No.
2:10-CV-01061-MEA), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/az_sb1070_complaint
_20100517.pdf; Complaint, Escobar v. Brewer, No. 4:10-CV-00249-DCB (D. Ariz. Apr. 29,
2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/30717024/Escobar-v-Brewer; Complaint, Nat’l
Coal. of Latino Clergy & Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. 2:10-CV-00943 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29,
2010),
available
at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:
2010cv00943/519056/1/; Complaint, Salgado v. Brewer, No. 2:10-CV-00951-SRB (D. Ariz.
Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/34428984/Salgado-v-Brewer-A-Cop-sLawsuit-Against-Arizona-s-New-Immigration-Law; Complaint, Frisancho v. Brewer, No. 2:10CV-00926-MEA (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites
/default/files/docs/lac/Frisancho-v-Brewer-complaint.pdf.
64. See Complaint, Escobar, supra note 63, ¶ 31 (alleging S.B. 1070 compels Arizona police
“to actively engage in racial profiling to detain, question and require every Hispanic found within
the limits of the City of Tucson to prove their legal status in the United States”); id. ¶¶ 38–40
(alleging S.B. 1070 “was enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona and signed into law
by Defendant Brewer as a result of racial bias and anti-Hispanic beliefs and sentiments” and “is
the product of racial bias aimed specifically at Hispanics”); see also Complaint, Salgado, supra
note 63, ¶ 31 (alleging that S.B. 1070 will require the plaintiff, an Arizona police officer, “to use
race as a primary factor in enforcing the various provisions of the Act”); Complaint, Frisancho,

Winter 2013]

ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES

643

and well-attended protests took place throughout the spring and
summer.65 In June, the federal government expressed its
disinclination toward Arizona’s brand of “cooperative enforcement
of federal immigration laws” by suing to enjoin S.B. 1070, on
preemption grounds, before it went into effect.66 On July 28, 2010,
United States District Judge Susan Bolton granted the federal
government’s request for a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the four provisions of S.B. 1070 detailed above.67
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
United States argued that Arizona’s law would hamper federal
immigration enforcement, impede U.S. foreign policy, and
“prevent[] true cooperation by state and local officials with the

supra note 63, ¶¶ 43–48 (alleging S.B. 1070 was adopted “because of, not merely in spite of, its
adverse effect upon a discrete and insular minority—Hispanics”).
65. E.g., Parker Leavitt & Nathan Gonzalez, 2,500 Protest Law at State Capitol, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 2010, at B1; Brady McCombs, Immigration Bill Prompts Protests in Tucson,
Phoenix, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Apr. 20, 2010), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border
/article_7f8be9a8-4cb2-11df-906c-001cc4c002e0.html; Jim Nintzel, May Day Protest:
Thousands Assemble Downtown To Protest SB 1070, TUCSON WEEKLY (May 2, 2010),
http://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2010/05/02/may-day-protest-thousandsassemble-downtown-to-protest-sb-1070; Thousands in Phoenix Protest Against SB 1070,
Thousands of SB 1070 Supporters Rally in Tempe, KVOA (May 30, 2010), http://www.kvoa.com
/news/thousands-in-phoenix-protest-against-sb-1070-thousands-of-sb-1070-supporters-rally-intempe/.
66. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff'd, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (enjoining
enforcement of most provisions of the bill). Federal judges in Georgia, Indiana, and Utah
similarly granted preliminary injunctions blocking immigration legislation in those States. Ga.
Latino Alliance For Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Buquer v.
City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Order Granting Temporary Restraining
Order at 1, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-401 CW (D. Utah filed May 11,
2011), 2011 WL 7143098, at *1. A lawsuit was also filed in Alabama to block legislation there.
Complaint at 1, Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB, (N.D. Ala.
filed July 8, 2011).
67. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
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federal officials responsible for enforcing federal law.”68 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed Judge Bolton’s issuance of the injunction.69
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion struck a blow to the “inherent
authority” argument that proponents of state and local enforcement
had advanced in the wake of the 2002 OLC memorandum. 70 The
Ninth Circuit explicitly held that Arizona officers have no inherent
authority to enforce federal civil immigration law.71 In so doing, the
court issued a scathing rejection of the 2002 OLC memo, criticizing
its logic and noting that the 2002 OLC memo (written during the
administration of President George W. Bush) reached a conclusion
opposite from the one the OLC had reached in 1996 (during the
administration of President Clinton),72 which in turn was different
from the conclusion the OLC had reached in 1989 (under President
George H.W. Bush).73 This flip-flopping, the Ninth Circuit found,
demonstrated why “[i]t is an axiomatic separation of powers
principle that legal opinions of Executive lawyers are not binding on
federal courts.”74
Finding no “inherent authority” for states to enforce federal
immigration laws, the Ninth Circuit looked unsuccessfully for
evidence that the federal government had delegated to state officers
the general authority to make civil immigration arrests as authorized
in Section 6 of S.B. 1070.75 The court instead found that Section 6
conflicted with the federal statutory structure, holding that federal
law permitting state and local officials to arrest certain immigration

68. Brief for Appellee at 25–26, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162512,
at *25–26. A coalition of cities and local governments argued Arizona’s laws, if permitted, would
send a message that “will reverberate not just in Arizona but in every state across the country,
making immigrants—whether they are naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, visa
holders, or undocumented individuals—deeply distrustful of local governments and law
enforcement officials” and “will have serious, long-term deleterious effects on the ability of local
governments nationwide to protect the health and safety of all residents within their
jurisdictions.” Brief of Amici Curiae the County of Santa Clara et al. at 2–3, Arizona, 641 F.3d
339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162525, at *2–3.
69. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 344.
70. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
71. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 362.
72. The 1996 OLC memorandum found that state officers had no inherent authority to
enforce federal immigration laws. 2002 OLC Memorandum, supra note 33, at 1–2, 5.
73. See id. at 7.
74. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 365 n.24.
75. Id. at 362.
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violators76 preempted the portion of S.B. 1070 that broadly permitted
Arizona law enforcement officials to arrest any suspected
immigration violator.77
While the Ninth Circuit’s express rejection of the “inherent
authority” argument was limited to Section 6 of S.B. 1070, the court
also found that other sections of S.B. 1070 sought to legislate in
areas where states have not traditionally legislated.78 Section 2(B),
which required state officers to identify immigration violators, was
not legislation in an area of traditional state concern.79 Similarly,
punishing unauthorized immigrants for their failure to comply with
federal registration laws, under Section 3 of S.B. 1070, was not held
to be within the state’s traditionally exercised power.80
The Ninth Circuit did uphold Arizona’s authority in one
instance. With respect to Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, which made it a
state crime for an unauthorized immigrant to seek employment, the
court noted that “the power to regulate the employment of
unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police
powers.”81 The court relied for this proposition on its opinion in
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,82 which in turn relied on
the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in DeCanas v. Bica,83 where the
Ninth Circuit held that “the authority to regulate the employment of
unauthorized workers is ‘within the mainstream’ of the state’s police
powers.”84 The Ninth Circuit in Chicanos Por La Causa rejected the
suggestion that the holding of DeCanas had been weakened by the

76. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006) (permitting state and local officers, “to the extent permitted by
relevant State and local law,” to arrest and detain an alien illegally present who “has previously
been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such
conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate
confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual.”
(emphasis added)).
77. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 361–66.
78. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009))
(explaining that had “Congress . . . legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,” a presumption against federal preemption would have applied).
79. Id. at 348.
80. Id. at 355.
81. Id. at 357.
82. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
83. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
84. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc., 558 F.3d at 864 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356, 365).
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subsequent passage of extensive federal legislation governing the
employment of unauthorized immigrants.85
After the Ninth Circuit’s Arizona decision, Chicanos Por La
Causa made its way to the Supreme Court. Under the name of
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting,86 the Court
held that another Arizona law concerning immigrants, which
imposed licensing restrictions on businesses employing
undocumented workers and required businesses to use the federal
“E-Verify” system, was not preempted by federal control over
immigration.87 As the Ninth Circuit had done previously in Chicanos
Por La Causa and Arizona, the Court noted (relying on DeCanas)
that state regulation of immigrants’ employment is within a field of
legislation traditionally occupied by the states.88
The stage was now set for the United States Supreme Court to
decide the fate of S.B. 1070. It was a case that some might have
believed promised resolution of important questions of civil rights
and inherent state authority concerning immigration,89 but no
resolution would be forthcoming.
C. The Decision in
Arizona v. United States90
In a 5–3 decision,91 the Court struck down three of the four
provisions of S.B. 1070 that were at issue.92 The Court did so on
85. Id. at 864–65.
86. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
87. Id. at 1974. “[P]rohibit[ing] the knowing employment . . . of persons not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the mainstream of
[the State’s] police power.” Id. (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356); see also DeCanas, 424 U.S.
at 356 (“States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State.”). See generally Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The
“Arizonification” of Immigration Law: Implications of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting for
State and Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 85, 89 (2012) (predicting the
Supreme Court would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling striking down S.B. 1070 despite the
Court’s holding in Whiting that Arizona was not preempted in its efforts to regulate the
employment of unauthorized aliens).
88. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973–75.
89. But see Johnson, supra note 3, at 629–32 (suggesting the “civil rights implications for
communities of color” would remain unaddressed due to the procedural posture of the case).
90. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
91. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg. Justice Kagan took no part in the
decision, having recused herself presumably because of her work for the Obama administration as
solicitor general. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in
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preemption grounds.93 The single provision left intact—Section 2(B),
colloquially known as the “show me your papers”94 or “papers,
please”95 provision—was held not preempted, but only because the
Court found the provision could conceivably be implemented in a
manner consistent with federal law.96 The Court reserved for the
future the possibility that the law as implemented would be subject to
a preemption or other constitutional challenge.97 Much of the Court’s
discussion concerned potential Fourth Amendment problems that
may attend the implementation of the provision.98
The Court’s opinion is notable for its struthious avoidance of
two issues that might have been expected to dominate the discussion:
“inherent authority” and civil rights. Expected to be a major factor in
the Court’s decision, the “inherent authority” of state and local law
enforcement officers to enforce immigration laws was prominently
absent from the opinions, except in Justice Scalia’s bilious dissent,
which broadly asserted the police power of the states to engage in
immigration enforcement.99 Similarly, the civil rights issue that had
long been at the core of the debate over S.B. 1070—racial
profiling—was generally missing, briefly mentioned only in Justice
Alito’s opinion concerning Section 2(B).100

part—both Justices would have upheld S.B. 1070 in its entirety. Id. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2522–24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which he agreed that the majority correctly struck down Section 3 as preempted, and expressed
his view that the remaining sections of S.B. 1070 were unobjectionable. Id. at 2524–25 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505, 2507 (holding sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted).
93. Id.
94. See Bill Keller, Show Me Your Papers, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at A15. Section 2(B)
requires Arizona officers to make reasonable attempts to ascertain the immigration status of those
stopped, detained, or arrested. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2011).
95. See Peter Spiro, SB 1070 Argument Recap: “Papers, Please” Likely to Stick, Other
Provisions Not So Clear, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/25/sb1070-argument-recap-papers-please-likely-to-stick-other-provisions-not-so-clear/ (using “papers,
please” but cautioning that the label is “not entirely accurate, insofar as [under S.B. 1070] an
officer first requires some other reason to stop, detain, or arrest an individual—suspected
undocumented status by itself isn’t enough to initiate the process”).
96. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509–10.
97. Id. at 2510.
98. Id. at 2527–29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. See id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. See id. at 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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How the case was presented provides one possible explanation
for the lack of attention to racial profiling. Various groups had sued
to enjoin S.B. 1070 on the basis that it violated equal protection
guarantees because it was “enacted with the purpose and intent to
discriminate against racial and national origin minorities, including
Latinos, on the basis of race and national origin” and would cause
“widespread racial profiling and will subject many persons of
color . . . to unlawful interrogations, searches, seizures and
arrests.”101 But only the case filed by the United States, which relied
on preemption and not profiling, was taken up by the Supreme
Court.102 Nonetheless, several of the amicus briefs raised the
profiling issue, giving the Court the opportunity to do so as well103—
an opportunity the Court rebuffed.
1. The Court’s Preemption Analysis
In addressing the four provisions of S.B. 1070 at stake, the Court
employed both “field preemption” and “obstacle preemption”
analysis.
101. Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and
Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 49–52 (2011) (quoting Complaint, Friendly
House v. Whiting, No. CV10-1061, at 6 (D. Ariz. dismissed Sept. 16, 2010)).
102. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 631–32 (suggesting the preemption arguments are “easier
for the U.S. government to prevail upon than rights-based claims, while also avoiding the charge
that the Administration is playing the proverbial ‘race card’”); see also Johnson, supra note 30, at
673 (observing, in discussing California’s Proposition 187, that there are “many explanations why
courts will avoid even asking, much less deciding, whether race, color, and ethnicity
impermissibly motivated” state anti-immigrant legislation). Gerald P. López juxtaposes the fact
that the Obama administration had proved indifferent to claims of racial profiling in its “Secure
Communities” immigration enforcement initiative with a description of how the administration
“[s]idestepp[ed] substantial evidence of racial profiling and anti-immigrant hysteria [and] relied
upon traditionally influential preemption arguments” in its attack on S.B. 1070. López, supra note
26, at 1804–05.
103. E.g., Brief of Argentina et al. at 28–35, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182),
2012 WL 1114006, at *28–35; Brief of Amici Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice et
al. at 21–23, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), WL 1044364, at *21–23; Brief of
Former Arizona Attorneys General Terry Goddard and Grant Woods et al. at 14–20, Arizona, 132
S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1044358, at *14–20. The brief for the United States
also alluded to civil rights issues pertaining to Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070—making it a crime for
an unauthorized alien to seek employment. In describing Congress’s statutory scheme governing
unauthorized employment—which the United States described as a “comprehensive scheme
prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States” that “leaves no room for the
imposition of state criminal liability on individual aliens”—the United States noted the “civil
rights” provisions of the statutory scheme, which prohibit discrimination against job applicants on
the basis of national origin or citizenship. Brief for United States at 34–37 & n.22, Arizona, 132
S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *34–37 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
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Field preemption, the Court explained, can occur in two ways.
Congress may indicate its intent to displace state law entirely by
implementing a “framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that
Congress [leaves] no room for the States to supplement it.’”104
Alternatively, field preemption occurs where there is a “federal
interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”105
“Obstacle preemption” involves a detailed comparison of the
state and federal statutes to determine whether state and federal law
conflict. Obstacle preemption occurs “where the challenged state law
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”106
a. Section 3—criminalizing noncompliance
with federal registration laws—held subject to field preemption
First, the Court struck down Section 3 of S.B. 1070. Section 3
created a new state misdemeanor for failing to obey federal laws
requiring the carrying of an “alien registration document.”107 The
Court rejected the “mirror” theory of preemption advocated by
Arizona and its supporters,108 which holds that so long as state laws
punish only what is punishable under corresponding federal laws
there can be no preemption because there is no conflict between the
state and federal laws.109 The Court held the “comprehensive”
scheme of federal regulation of alien registration occupied the
field.110

104. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
107. Id.
108. See Margaret M. Stock, Online Symposium: The Court Throws Arizona a Tough Bone to
Chew, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=147811 (“For legal
scholars, the most critical point is that the Supreme Court rejected the “mirror image” theory of
preemption, which had been put forth by Kris Kobach, who was Mitt Romney’s immigration
advisor during the Republican primary campaign. The “mirror image” theory—which argues that
state immigration laws are constitutional if they “mirror” federal laws—was soundly rejected by
five Justices of the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice John Roberts.”).
109. See id.
110. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
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Six Justices agreed that Section 3 was subject to field
preemption, with Justice Alito joining the five-member majority
opinion.111 These six Justices grounded their holding in the Court’s
1941 decision in Hines v. Davidowitz.112 A brief discussion of Hines
is in order.
In Hines, the Court held Pennsylvania’s alien registration
system, adopted in 1939, had been preempted by Congress’s 1940
enactment of a comprehensive registration system, the Alien
Registration Act.113 Both the Pennsylvania and federal enactments
required aliens to register and notify authorities of any change in
address.114 In addition, the Pennsylvania law required an alien over
eighteen years old to
receive an alien identification card and carry it at all times;
show the card whenever it may be demanded by any police
officer or any agent of the Department of Labor and
Industry; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to
registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a
license to operate one.115
The Court’s opinion in Hines engaged two entwined narratives,
and partly because of these two distinct narratives, Hines can be read
as an instance either of field preemption or of obstacle preemption.
The first narrative is one of the federal government’s plenary power
over foreign affairs, and its more sweeping language suggests a field
preemption analysis. Laws imposing burdens upon aliens, wrote the
Hines majority, cannot be considered purely local exercises of state
police power.116 “[E]ven though [such laws] may be immediately
associated with the accomplishment of a local purpose, they provoke
questions in the field of international affairs.”117 That field being “the
one aspect of our government that from the first has been most
generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national
111. Id. at 2524–25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented, and would have upheld Section 3 against the preemption challenge. Id. at 2511
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
112. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
113. Id. at 72–74.
114. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 673–76 (1940).
115. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59.
116. See id. at 66.
117. Id.
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authority,” wrote the Court, “[a]ny concurrent state power that may
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.”118 It was not difficult
for the Court to reach the conclusion that there is no “equal and
continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation” when it
comes to immigration, and that Pennsylvania’s law must, by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, yield.119
The second narrative in Hines emphasized alien registration as a
civil liberties issue. The Court suggested that civil liberties factored
into the preemption analysis as much as the foreign affairs concern
did, finding it “also of importance that this legislation deals with the
rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings.”120
The Hines Court began its discussion of the civil liberties issue
by noting the hostility historically attendant to any suggestion that an
alien be required to carry some form of registration on his or her
person.121 The Court quoted opposition to an 1892 registration law
that compared the requirement to measures implemented for convicts
and for slaves:
[The Chinese covered by the Act] are here ticket-of-leave
men. Precisely as, under the Australian law, a convict is
allowed to go at large upon a ticket-of-leave, these people
are to be allowed to go at large and earn their livelihood,
but they must have their tickets-of-leave in their
possession . . . . This inaugurates in our system of
government a new departure; one, I believe never before
practiced, although it was suggested in conference that
some such rules had been adopted in slavery times to secure
the peace of society.122
According to this narrative, Congress’s decision to omit any
requirement that an alien carry registration from the Alien
Registration Act of 1940 was a deliberate act intended to preserve

118. Id. at 68.
119. Id.; see also id. at 66 & n.17 (“[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also
acts on the same subject, ‘the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.’”).
120. Id. at 67–68.
121. Id. at 68.
122. Id. at 71 (alterations in the original).
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valued civil liberties. Congress “tr[ied] to steer a middle path” by
enacting a registration requirement but
in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of lawabiding aliens through one uniform national registration
system, and to leave them free from the possibility of
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not
only affect our international relations but might also
generate the very disloyalty which the law has intended
guarding against.123
The Hines opinion thus cast the federal government into the role
of protector/enforcer not just with respect to foreign affairs but also
with respect to civil liberties. The Court’s analysis with respect to the
civil liberties issue in Hines focused on a specific difference between
the Pennsylvania and federal statutes and suggested an “obstacle
preemption” analysis.124
The way the Arizona majority treats Hines is interesting because
of its characterization of Hines as a field preemption case and its
preference for the foreign affairs narrative over the civil rights
narrative.125 The Court’s citations in support of reading Hines as a
field preemption case speak to the ascendance of the national interest
and remoteness of the states’ interests in matters touching on foreign
affairs.126 This analysis is hard to confine to the discrete area of alien

123. Id. at 73–74. A decade after Hines, Congress enacted a statute requiring every alien
eighteen years of age or older to “at all times carry with him and have in his personal possession”
his registration certificate or card. Willful violation of this statute was punishable by a fine of
$100, imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
ch. 477, 66 Stat. 224 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1304 (1996)). The registration carrying
requirement did not appear to spark controversy in 1952. See Developments in the Law
Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 679–80 (1953). More recently, following
9/11, the federal government again initiated controversial registration rules. The civil rights
implications were noted this time. See Wishnie, supra note 37, at 1102–03 (noting racial profiling
concerns raised by the federal government’s attempt to enlist state and local law enforcement
officials to police the NSEERS program).
124. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 69–74.
125. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); see also id. at 2529 (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although there is some ambiguity in Hines, the
Court largely spoke in the language of field pre-emption.”).
126. One opinion cited by the Arizona majority characterized Hines as a field preemption case
in these terms:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be
the appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it had,

Winter 2013]

ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES

653

registration, as opposed to immigration more generally. Indeed the
emphasis on the importance of the nation speaking with one voice on
immigration echoes throughout the Court’s opinion.127
On the other hand, the Arizona Court’s preference for the
foreign affairs narrative nearly completely obscured the civil rights
aspect of Hines.128 The Court missed a clear opportunity, for Section
3 of S.B. 1070, like the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Hines, could
be characterized as a state’s effort to outpace federal immigration
enforcement during times of perceived crisis. In Hines, the state
sought to add a provision that required immigrants to carry their
registration—a provision deliberately left out of the federal
legislation.129 In Arizona, the state added a “no probation” provision
to the state-law registration crime it created to parallel the federal
crime.130 This, along with the possibility that Arizona would enforce
its registration crime more zealously than the federal government
without reference to the degree of any conflict, the principle having been established
that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National Government.
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 419 n.11 (2003) (citing Hines 312 U.S. at 63); Arizona,
132 S. Ct. at 2502 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11). See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))
(characterizing Hines as a case in which state regulation “touch[ed] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system (must) be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject”); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2098–99, 2107 (2000) (arguing that “Hines may be better understood as a field preemption case
because the opinion relied on the uniquely national nature of regulating aliens to hold that state
laws on the same subject are displaced”).
127. E.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (“The Government of the United States has broad,
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. . . . It is fundamental
that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the
United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national
sovereign, not the 50 separate States.” (citations omitted)); id. at 2506–07 (“A decision on
removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national to
continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must
be made with one voice.”).
128. The Court noted that in Hines, “The new federal law struck a careful balance. It punished
an alien's willful failure to register but did not require aliens to carry identification cards.” Id. at
2501. But the Court’s inclusion of these facts hardly paints Hines as a case involving civil
liberties—these details are supplied to demonstrate that Congress made deliberate choices in
crafting a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 74).
Justice Alito did note the Court’s conclusion in Hines that Congress’s intent was “to protect the
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system.” Id. at
2529–30 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hines 312 U.S. at 74). This
was not much more than a passing comment, however. No effort was made to link the civil rights
tone of Hines to current civil rights issues.
129. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59–60.
130. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503.
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would enforce its own registration crime, was noted by the Court as a
way in which Arizona’s scheme conflicted with Congress’s.131 But
whereas the Hines Court saw the conflict created by Pennsylvania’s
anti-immigrant law as implicating the federal government’s role as
protector of civil liberties, the Arizona Court tepidly noted that the
conflicts “simply underscore the reason for field preemption.”132
Rather than focusing on the civil rights concern presented by the
state’s attempt to outpace federal enforcement, the Arizona Court
consistently returned the conversation to the potential interference
with the federal government’s power over foreign affairs.133
The avoidance of a civil rights narrative was consistent with the
Arizona opinion as a whole. The Court, throughout its opinion,
declined to reach the civil rights issues that many saw as being at the
heart of the case, preferring instead a relatively sanitized preemption
analysis focusing on “fields” and “obstacles.”134 Given the centrality
of civil rights issues to the debate over the role of state and local
governments in immigration enforcement and the presence of civil
rights concerns as a basis for the Hines Court’s holding, the absence
of any discussion of these issues in Arizona was glaring.
b. Section 5(C)—criminalizing
the unauthorized seeking of work—
held subject to obstacle preemption
Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 creates a state criminal prohibition on
undocumented immigrants who seek employment where no federal
counterpart exists.135
Just as the Arizona Court used Hines to show that it was not
drawing on a blank slate with regard to state criminal laws
concerning alien registration, the Court used precedent to color its
analysis for Section 5(C)’s regulation of the employment of
undocumented immigrants. In its 1976 decision in DeCanas v.

131. Id. at 2502–03.
132. Id. at 2503.
133. Id. at 2497–98 (“The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration
and alien status rests . . . on its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign
relations . . . .”).
134. Id. at 2501.
135. Id. at 2503.
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Bica,136 the Court upheld a California law imposing sanctions on
those who “knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”137 The Court rejected the
conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the statute was
subject to field preemption.138
While affirming the notion that the “[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” the
DeCanas Court cautioned that not every state law dealing with
immigrants is preempted as a “regulation of immigration.”139 The
Court characterized California’s law as within the state’s “broad
authority under [its] police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State” and as “focuse[d]
directly upon . . . essentially local problems.”140 Congress, on the
other hand, had shown no more than a “peripheral” interest in
regulating the employment of the undocumented.141 And that subject
matter was not necessarily encompassed within the broad framework
of “immigration”142: “The comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for
regulation of immigration and naturalization, without more, cannot
be said to draw in the employment of illegal aliens . . . .”143 Thus
DeCanas permitted state laws in service of protecting state workers
to stand, given Congress’s apparent lack of activity with respect to
undocumented workers.
The Arizona majority was quick to point out, however, that the
“peripheral” interest of Congress in employment of the
136. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
137. Id. at 352–53.
138. The court of appeal held that “in the area of immigration and naturalization,
congressional power is exclusive,” and construed Congress’s failure to include employer
sanctions in the INA as a deliberate and intentional aspect of its comprehensive scheme
governing immigration. Id. at 353–54 (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979 (1974)).
139. Id. at 354–55.
140. Id. at 356–57.
141. Id. at 360.
142. Id. at 360 n.8 (“Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated
formula that Congress ‘by occupying the field’ has excluded from it all state legislation. Every
Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we
can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the
Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of
its constitutional setting and its legislative history.” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
78–79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting))).
143. Id. at 359.
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undocumented had attained central significance in 1986, when
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(“IRCA”). IRCA, described by the Court as “a comprehensive
framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens,’”144
imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers of unauthorized
workers, and civil (but not criminal) penalties on the workers
themselves.145 Given this complete scheme, the Court found that
“Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties
on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment.”146
Given the Court’s description of IRCA as providing a
“comprehensive framework” concerning employment of undocument
ed workers, and given the connection between this subject and the
foreign affairs power, it is something of a mystery that the Court did
not hold that Section 5(C) was, like Section 3, subject to field
preemption.147 This is especially so given that the Court’s obstacle
preemption analysis tracks essentially the same conflict the Court
observed with respect to Section 3. “[C]onflict is imminent whenever
two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity,”148
wrote the Court in reference to the unavailability of probation as a
possible sentence for alien registration crimes under Section 3 of
S.B. 1070 despite its availability for the same crimes under federal
law. Similarly, even though the Court determined Section 5(C) was
an “attempt to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the
deterrence of unlawful employment”—it nonetheless conflicted with
federal law because of “a conflict in the method of enforcement.”149

144. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012) (quoting Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)).
145. Id. IRCA does impose criminal penalties on unauthorized workers who obtain
employment by fraud. Id.
146. Id.
147. The United States argued that Section 5(C) was subject to field preemption and
alternatively subject to obstacle preemption. Brief for the United States at 36, Arizona, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048 at *20 (arguing that IRCA “leaves no room for the
imposition of state criminal liability on individual aliens”); Id. at 39 (arguing that “[e]ven if IRCA
left room for supplemental state measures” Section 5 “conflict[s] with the careful balance
Congress struck [in IRCA]”); Oral Argument at 71, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11182), 2012 WL 1425227, at *71 (“[W]e're making both a field and a conflict preemption
argument here . . . .”).
148. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)).
149. Id. at 2505.
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Yet whereas the Court found that this enforcement conflict “simply
underscore[d] the reason for field preemption” of Section 3, the
Court eschewed field preemption and relied exclusively on the
enforcement conflict to find Section 5(C) subject to obstacle
preemption.150
While the Court reached opposite results using a similar analysis
on Sections 3 and 5(C), the Court was consistent in its avoidance of
any discussion of the civil rights implications of both sections. Just
as the Court failed in its discussion of Section 3 even to note the civil
rights concerns raised by alien registration provisions, and the
possibility of their enforcement by anti-immigrant local authorities,
the Court turned a blind eye to the civil rights implications of
employer and employee sanctions in its discussion of Section 5(C).
The Court did give a nod to the humanitarian concerns that prompted
Congress to adopt principally employer sanctions in IRCA, noting
that Congress’s judgment not to punish unauthorized workers was in
part because they “already face[d] the possibility of employer
exploitation because of their removable status.”151 But the Court
ignored entirely the civil rights concerns raised by the federal
government in its brief.
Prior to IRCA, federal law provided no penalty for an employer
of unauthorized workers.152 During the process of appraising
employer sanctions, Congress considered argument and testimony
that employer sanctions would lead to employer discrimination
against job applicants perceived to be foreign.153 As a result, IRCA
150. Some possible reasons the Court did not embrace a field preemption theory with respect
to Section 5 are as follows: the Court attempted to temper its holding of field preemption with
respect to Section 3, and preserve some area in which the states can legislate; the Court gave
some deference to the DeCanas precedent; the Court was inhibited from pursuing field
preemption due to the presence of an express preemption provision which explicitly permits some
state involvement in the field of employment regulation, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977–81 (2011) (holding Arizona law, providing for suspension or
revocation of various licenses of an employer of unauthorized workers, was within the saving
clause of IRCA’s express preemption provision); and the Court was reluctant to embrace the field
preemption argument of the United States given that the United States failed to argue field
preemption in Whiting, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (No. 09-115), 2010 WL 3501180 (arguing only express and obstacle
preemption).
151. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.
152. See id. at 2519–20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 68 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672;
Darcy M. Pottle, Federal Employer Sanctions as Immigration Federalism, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L.
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contained antidiscrimination provisions “because of the concern . . .
that people of ‘foreign’ appearance might be made more vulnerable
by the imposition of sanctions . . . [and] that some employers may
decide not to hire ‘foreign’ appearing individuals to avoid
sanctions.”154 IRCA’s antidiscrimination provisions made it unlawful
to engage in employment discrimination on the basis of national
origin or citizenship status, required the President to appoint a
“Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment
Practices” to investigate and bring complaints, and provided for
hearings before administrative judges to be assigned by the attorney
general.155 IRCA also required the General Accounting Office to
conduct three annual studies to determine whether widespread
discrimination was occurring as a result of employer sanctions.156
The antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA were augmented in
1990157 and again in 1996.158
In its brief, the United States referred to these antidiscrimination
provisions in describing Congress’s “comprehensive federal scheme
governing the employment of aliens.”159 The United States argued
that Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, which criminalizes an unauthorized
worker’s mere act of applying for or soliciting work, conflicted with
Congress’s antidiscrimination laws that forbid any pre-hiring inquiry
into a worker’s employment authorization in order to prevent

99, 136–37 (2010); see generally Steven M. Kaplan, The Employer Sanctions Provision of IRCA:
Deterrence or Discrimination?, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 549–50 (1992) (concluding that IRCA
resulted in widespread discrimination); Sarah M. Kendall, America’s Minorities Are Shown the
“Back Door” . . . Again: The Discriminatory Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 899, 904–06 (1996) (indicating a pattern of widespread discrimination
against persons perceived as alien as a direct result of IRCA’s implementation).
154. H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, at 87 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5840, 5842.
155. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 102(a), 100 Stat. 3374, 3375–76.
156. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3369–70.
157. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 531, 104 Stat. 5054; see Kaplan, supra
note 153, at 550–52.
158. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 404(d)(4)(B), 110 Stat. 3009-664 (8 U.S.C. § 1324a note), cited in Brief for the
United States at 41, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL
939048, at *41.
159. Brief for the United States at 34, 37 n.22, 40–41, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No.
11-182), 2012 WL 939048 at *34, *37 n.22, *40–41.
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discrimination in hiring.160 Yet the Arizona Court did not note these
or any other civil rights concerns with Section 5(C).161 Instead, the
Court merely found that Arizona’s employee sanctions conflicted
with Congress’s deliberate omission of criminal employee sanctions
from its comprehensive scheme.
Just as the Court in its discussion of Section 3 avoided readily
available avenues for engaging the civil rights narrative, so did it
remain reticent even though similar opportunities were presented to
the Court with respect to Section 5(C). The Court completely ignored
Congress’s concern for civil liberties when it crafted its
comprehensive
statutory scheme
governing unauthorized
employment. But congressional concern for protecting civil liberties
was not irrelevant in Hines and should not have been in Arizona
either. Here again the Court missed the forest for the fields and
obstacles.

160. Id. at 40–41. While the congressional scheme was aimed at preventing discrimination,
there is strong evidence that the anti-discrimination provisions were not effective. See Kaplan,
supra note 153, at 554–55 (1992) (concluding the IRCA employer sanctions caused “widespread”
discrimination); Kendall, supra note 153.
161. There are, of course, other arguments not made by the United States that Section 5(C)
would result in civil rights violations. While “applying for work” may occur in a private place,
Section 5(C) also makes it a crime for an unauthorized worker to “solicit work in a public place
or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.” Enforcement of these
criminal provisions raises racial profiling, selective enforcement, and First Amendment concerns,
particularly for day laborers. See Kristina M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech: AntiSolicitation Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of “Backdoor” Local Immigration
Regulations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1 (2010) (“While many day laborers are lawfully present or
have authorization to work in the United States, some people assume day laborers to be ‘illegal
aliens’ due to the high-profile nature of their job search—which usually involves waiting on
corners in front of ‘big-box’ stores or in nearby labor centers for a potential employer to offer
them work . . . . As such, day laborers are a visible and vulnerable population, subject to
discriminatory treatment on the basis of real or perceived immigration status on a daily basis.”);
id. at 3–22 (analyzing cases addressing day laborers’ First Amendment right to solicit
employment); Id. at 26–30 (discussing racial profiling of day laborers); Wishnie, supra note 37,
at 1104 (“Even before the September 11 attacks, INS regularly engaged in racial profiling and
selective enforcement based on ethnic appearance. . . . [Especially in] worksite raids, federal
agents [continue to] single out worksites . . . based on the presence of ‘Spanish music’ or workers
of ‘Hispanic appearance,’ and target individual Latinos—from amidst ethnically diverse
workforces—for questioning, arrest, and prosecution.”).
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c. Section 6—permitting Arizona officers
to effect civil immigration arrests—
held subject to obstacle preemption
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 purported to expand state arrest power to
include arrests based on “probable cause to believe [a person] has
committed any public offense that makes [him or her] removable
from the United States.”162
Five Justices agreed Section 6 was subject to “obstacle”
preemption.163 At its core, the question presented by Section 6 was
whether state officials can make civil immigration arrests.164
The majority first focused on the statutory structure that
Congress put in place for the arrest of suspected civil immigration
violators.165 Three threads run through this analysis of Congress’s
statutory structure. First, Congress has directed with specificity the
narrow circumstances under which immigration arrests may occur.166
Second, Congress has expressed through its legislative enactments a
concern for the competence of nonfederal officials to enforce federal
immigration law.167 Third, the statutory structure of the Immigration
and Nationality Act reflects a determination that immigration
enforcement requires the Nation to speak “with one voice”—the
voice of the federal government.168
The majority first noted that Congress’s “statutory structure
instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal
process.”169 Congressional enactments limit the arrest power of
immigration officials to two circumstances.170 First, immigration
officials may execute administrative arrest warrants issued at the
discretion of the attorney general.171 Second, immigration officials
162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2011).
163. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497, 2507.
164. Id. at 2498.
165. Id. at 2505–07.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2507 (citing Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348
(2005)).
169. Id. at 2505.
170. Id. at 2505–06.
171. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006)). The administrative arrest warrants authorized by
INA § 236 are not the equivalent of criminal arrest warrants. The statute sets forth no standard for
the issuance of such warrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General,
an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
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may make warrantless arrests for civil immigration violations, but
only where the person is “likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained.”172
Contrasting Section 6 of S.B. 1070 with the statutory structure
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Court found Arizona’s
statute to be in conflict. “Section 6 attempts to provide state officers
even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible
removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration
officers,” the majority wrote, noting that Section 6 imported neither
the warrant requirement nor the likelihood of flight requirement for
warrantless arrests.173 “This is not the system Congress created,”
concluded the majority.174
The Court next observed that Congress’s statutory structure
carved a specific niche for state law enforcement out of its overall
immigration enforcement scheme. Most notably, Congress allowed
for formal agreements—known as 287(g) agreements because of
their statutory source175—between the executive branch and state or
local law-enforcement agencies, effectively deputizing those
agencies’ officers to enforce federal immigration law.176 Here the
from the United States.”). There is no requirement that such warrants be based upon sworn
testimony, or issued by a neutral magistrate. See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d
204, 230 & n.17 (D. Conn. 2011) (granting summary judgment on false arrest claim to plaintiff
who had been subject of administrative warrant); El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 579 F.
Supp. 2d 249, 275–76 (D. Conn. 2008) (treating arrest pursuant to administrative warrant as
warrantless arrest under Connecticut tort law and federal constitutional law for purposes of false
arrest claim).
172. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006)). The Court did not
explicitly note the other important requirement of § 1357—that an immigration official making a
warrantless arrest have “reason to believe” the arrestee has violated federal immigration law.
Courts have construed the “reason to believe” requirement as importing a probable cause
requirement in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1608 & n.229 (2010).
173. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
174. Id. In its discussion, the Court noted that immigration officials executing warrants are
required to have “received training in the enforcement of immigration law.” Id. Section 6 of
course did not include this requirement, and also did not require consultation between state and
federal officials. The majority expressed concern that Section 6 allowed state officers to make
immigration arrests “without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is
warranted in a particular case. This would allow [Arizona] to achieve its own immigration
policy.” Id.
175. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(g), 66 Stat. 233 (1952) (codified as amended 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)).
176. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
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Court paid special attention to the competency concerns evident in
Congress’s statutory structure, noting that 287(g) agreements not
only require nonfederal officers to be adequately trained to carry out
immigration duties, but also mandate that those officers be subject to
the federal government’s “direction and supervision.”177
After noting the need for immigration decisions to be “vested
solely in the Federal Government,”178 the Court discussed a statutory
provision relied on by Arizona permitting state and local law
enforcement to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention or removal” of immigration
violators.179 No “coherent” understanding of this provision, wrote the
Court, would encompass the “unilateral decision of state officers to
arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or
other instruction from the Federal Government.”180 The Court
endorsed examples of “cooperation” such as a joint state-federal task
force or the provision by state officers of “operational support in
executing a warrant.”181 Section 6, vesting broad unilateral arrest
authority in Arizona officials, could not be justified as state-federal
“cooperation” as envisioned by Congress and delineated in its
statutory structure.
Here again the Court’s opinion dodged the civil rights
implications of the debate. Following the passage of S.B. 1070,
commentators assailed the statute, and Section 6 in particular, as
likely to promote racial profiling in Arizona.182 But the Court paid no

177. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g)(2)–(3)).
178. Id. at 2507.
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).
180. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
181. Id. In discussing what might constitute “cooperation” under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), the
majority explicitly mentioned immigration detainers. The Court’s citation to immigration
detainers as an example of state officers assisting federal immigration officials is discussed
below. See infra notes 339–343 and accompanying text.
182. E.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero
for the Immigrants' Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Robert F. Castro, Xenomorph!! Indians,
Latina/os, and the Alien Morphology of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
3–4 (2011); Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and
Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 49 (2011).
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attention to the issue, despite it being presented in several of the
amicus briefs filed in the Arizona case.183
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented from the Court’s
decision striking down Section 6. Each believed that local arrests
were justifiable as “cooperation” with the federal government.184
d. Section 2(B)—“Show Me Your Papers”
—held not facially preempted
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires Arizona officers to make
reasonable attempts to ascertain the immigration status of those
stopped, detained, or arrested, and in the case of arrested persons,
requires immigration status to be determined before release of the
arrestee.185 The Court held Section 2(B) not facially preempted.
The Court’s discussion of Section 2(B) began by noting some
“limits” to the requirements of Section 2(B), two of which involved
civil rights. The first “limit” forbids Arizona officers from
considering “race, color or national origin,” except to the extent
permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitutions.186 The
second “limit” directs Arizona officers to implement S.B. 1070 so as
to “protect[] the civil rights of all persons and respect[] the privileges
and immunities of United States citizens.”187
183. E.g., Brief of Argentina, et al. at 28–35, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182); Brief of
Amici Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al., at 21–23, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(No. 11-182); Brief of Former Arizona Attorneys General Terry Goddard and Grant Woods, et al.
at 14–20, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). In part, this was due to the strategy of the
United States. The United States omitted racial profiling from its brief and disclaimed the issue at
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, 45, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182).
Nonetheless, Solicitor General Verrilli brought in the profiling argument through a discussion of
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), and the concern the Hines Court had for “harassment.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–47, Hines, 312 U.S. 52 (No. 22). Of course, as we have seen,
the Court overlooked the civil rights aspects of Hines. See supra notes 129–132 and
accompanying text.
184. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2525 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The dissenters offered additional reasons for their disagreement as to
Section 6. For Justice Scalia, whose dissent will be discussed in greater detail below, see infra
Part II.C.3, the “most important point is that . . . Arizona is entitled to have ‘its own immigration
policy’—including a more rigorous enforcement policy—so long as that does not conflict with
federal law.” Id. at 2516–17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
186. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (majority opinion) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111051(B)).
187. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(L)).
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The reference to the “limits” of S.B. 1070 was as far as the
Arizona Court went in addressing the civil rights concerns raised by
S.B. 1070 and its opponents.188 The Court did not engage in a
discussion of racial profiling but instead merely quoted the supposed
safeguards embedded in S.B. 1070—safeguards amounting to
nothing more than a directive to Arizona officers to follow the
United States and Arizona Constitutions.189 That the Court quoted
these arguably empty safeguards190 in its discussion of the only
provision of S.B. 1070 it upheld against constitutional challenge
signaled the Court’s overall lack of concern for the civil rights issues
presented in this case.191
The Court upheld Section 2(B) principally because it viewed the
statutory provision as requiring nothing more than communication
between state and federal officials.192 “Consultation between federal
and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system,”
the Court wrote, and then catalogued statutes it believed indicated
Congress’s encouragement of state reporting of suspected
immigration violators.193 Despite the argument of the United States
that Section 2(B) might interfere with the executive branch’s
enforcement priorities,194 the Court held that the statutory scheme

188. Id. at 2507–08.
189. Id. at 2508.
190. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Phillips, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Federal Preemption of State and
Local Immigration Laws: A Case for a More Cooperative and Streamlined Approach to Judicial
Review of Subnational Immigration Laws, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 955, 996 (2012) (arguing that
section 11-1051(L) “amounts to mere rhetoric that does little to effectively combat the dangers of
racial profiling and enforcement of the law based on arbitrary judgments of race and national
origin”); David A. Selden, Julie A. Pace & Heidi Nunn-Gilman, Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial
Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 525–43 (2011) (tracing the history of the provision of S.B. 1070 relating to
racial profiling, noting its roots in segregationist rhetoric, and arguing the “anti-racial profiling”
provision is “deliberately murky”).
191. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10.
192. Id. at 2508.
193. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1644).
194. Id.; Brief for the United States at 16, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL
939048, at *13 (“By insisting indiscriminately on enforcement in all cases, and requiring state
and local officers (whenever practicable) to verify the immigration status of everyone they stop or
arrest if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present, Section 2 forbids
officers—on pain of civil penalties—from looking to the lead of federal officials and adhering to
the enforcement judgments and discretion of the federal Executive Branch.”).
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“leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a
routine matter.”195
The Court next addressed the argument that Section 2(B) might
result in the prolonged detention of persons “for no reason other than
to verify their immigration status.”196 The majority acknowledged
this would be a constitutional “concern.”197 But, applying a
narrowing construction, the Court held that Section 2(B) “could be
read to avoid these concerns.”198 If Section 2(B) “only requires state
officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized,
lawful detention or after a detainee has been released,” the Court
wrote, it would survive preemption, because of the Court’s prior
conclusion that the communication required by Section 2(B) was not
inconsistent with the statutory structure of the INA.199
The Court thus upheld a narrowly construed Section 2(B),
holding the status check requirement valid, provided that it does not
result in prolonged detention.200

195. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
196. Id. at 2509.
197. Id. The Fourth Amendment issue raised by prolonged detention is discussed below. See
infra Part III.C.1.
198. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509.
199. Id. Because it avoided the prolonged detention issue, the Court explicitly acknowledged
that its opinion “does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.” Id. at 2510 (emphasis added).
200. One possibility raised by this holding is that state officials would seek to ground
prolonged detention in reasonable suspicion that a detainee has committed a federal immigration
crime. This in turn raises the question of whether state officials have the authority to enforce
criminal immigration laws. Here as elsewhere, the Court’s opinion as to “inherent authority” was
ambiguous, leaving the issue undecided: “There is no need in this case to address whether
reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for
prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law.” Id. at 2509
(citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475–
76 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037
(9th Cir. 1999)).
There is no way to know whether with this sentence the Court left two questions
unanswered or one question with two alternative answers. By its citations to two cases suggesting
the authority of state officers to arrest for federal crimes, Di Re and Gonzales, one might
reasonably imply the only question remaining open is whether states’ inherent authority to
prolong detention based on reasonable suspicion of a federal immigration crime has been
preempted by Congress. But another possible reading is that the Arizona majority leaves open the
antecedent question of whether the states actually possess any inherent authority to enforce
federal immigration crimes.
These questions, however, including the question of the correct reading of this sentence
from the majority opinion, are beyond the scope of this Article.
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2. Fourth Amendment Concerns
with Prolonged Detention to
Investigate Immigration Status
Much of the Court’s opinion with respect to Section 2(B), which
was held not preempted, was devoted to the possible Fourth
Amendment issues attendant to Arizona’s “show me your papers”
law. The implications of that discussion will be far reaching.201
As noted above, the possibility presented by Section 2(B)—that
state officers would subject individuals to prolonged detention “for
no reason other than to verify their immigration status”202—was not
sufficiently demonstrated by the record for the majority to conclude
that prolonged detention would in fact occur and would constitute an
obstacle to Congress’s immigration enforcement scheme. The
majority was quick to note, however, that “[d]etaining individuals
solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional
concerns.”203 The cases cited indicate that the Fourth Amendment
was the source of these “constitutional concerns.”204 And the
majority’s suggestion that Arizona could avoid such concerns by not
prolonging detention to pursue the immigration status verification
required by Section 2(B), as well as the concluding note that the
Arizona decision “does not foreclose other preemption and
constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied,”205
reveals the depth of the majority’s concern that prolonged detention
would violate the Fourth Amendment.
201. See supra Section II.C.1.d.
202. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509.
203. Id. (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2005)).
204. The portion of Arizona v. Johnson presumably referenced by the majority states:
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a
traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily
continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop
ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver
and passengers they are free to leave. An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do
not measurably extend the duration of the stop.
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (citations omitted). The majority likewise quoted Caballes for the
proposition that “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the
driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
that mission.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
205. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
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Of the dissenters, Justices Alito and Scalia both recognized that
prolonged detention would raise Fourth Amendment concerns,206
with Justice Alito addressing the issue by means of an extended
hypothetical. Justice Alito’s opinion supposes that a police officer,
during a traffic stop for a speeding violation, “acquires reasonable
suspicion to believe that the driver entered the country illegally”—a
federal crime.207 While acknowledging that absent the acquisition of
reasonable suspicion, the traffic stop might “become unlawful if . . .
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that
mission,” Justice Alito opined that the officer’s acquisition of
reasonable suspicion “that [the driver] committed a different crime”
would justify extending the detention “for a reasonable time to verify
or dispel that suspicion.”208 The “length and nature” of this
additional investigation must remain reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Alito cautioned, for “[a]n investigative stop, if
prolonged, can become an arrest and thus require probable cause.”209
Given his conclusion that state officers could, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, reasonably prolong detention upon acquiring
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal immigration
violations,210 Justice Alito concluded that “[i]f properly
implemented, § 2(B) should not lead to federal constitutional
violations, but there is no denying that enforcement of § 2(B) will
multiply the occasions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment issues
206. Justice Scalia, while dismissing the Fourth Amendment discussion as dicta “hav[ing]
nothing to do with this case,” nonetheless acknowledged that “[o]f course, any investigatory
detention, including one under § 2(B), may become an ‘unreasonable . . . seizur[e],’ if it lasts too
long.” Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. IV) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Justice Thomas did not address the Fourth
Amendment issue in his discussion of Section 2(B). See id. at 2522–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. at 2528 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
(2006)).
208. Id. at 2528–29 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101
(2005)).
209. Id. at 2529 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Justice Alito noted that moving the
suspect from the site of the traffic stop, or “forcibly remov[ing] a person from his home or other
place in which he is entitled to be and transport[ing] him to the police station” would transform
the investigative stop into an arrest, requiring probable cause. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 816 (1985)).
210. This conclusion, of course, depends on whether state officers have authority to detain
suspects for federal crimes—a threshold question Justice Alito acknowledged and answered in the
affirmative. See id.
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will crop up.”211 To avoid such occasions, Justice Alito
recommended that both the federal and state governments issue
guidance to officers, and that officers be provided with a
“nonexclusive list containing forms of identification sufficient . . . to
dispel any suspicion of unlawful presence.”212
3. Justice Scalia’s Inherent Authority Argument
During the litigation over Arizona’s S.B. 1070, discussed above,
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether permitting State officers to
effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause for a civil
immigration violation was preempted by federal law. The first step in
the court’s inquiry was determining whether “arresting immigrants
for civil immigration violations” is “a field which the states have
traditionally occupied.”213 The court found it was not214 and went on
to hold explicitly that states have no inherent authority to enforce the
civil provisions of federal immigration law.215 By contrast, the Tenth
Circuit had upheld an arrest by local police based solely on
immigration status, holding that federal immigration law did not
preempt any “preexisting state or local authority to arrest individuals
violating federal immigration laws.”216
“Inherent authority,” then, was expected to be a major part of
the Court’s decision. Yet, despite the issue having been fairly joined
in the parties’ briefing,217 the majority opinion barely touched the
211. Id.
212. See id. Here, Justice Alito appears to have conflated “unlawful presence” with criminal
activity. Cf. id. at 2505 (majority opinion) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable
alien to remain present in the United States. If the police stop someone based on nothing more
than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”) (citing INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)).
213. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 348 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
214. Id. at 361.
215. Id. at 362. The court emphasized the federal statutes which authorize state and local
officers to enforce immigration laws and found that Congress had permitted limited state and
local involvement but preempted the remainder of the field. Id. at 361–66.
216. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). It does not
appear that the issue of whether such local arrests exceeded Oklahoma’s police power was
raised—indeed, the only issue addressed in the opinion is whether Federal law preempted State
authority. Id.
217. Arizona argued throughout that state officers have inherent authority to enforce both
criminal and civil immigration laws. In response, the United States argued that “Arizona has no
inherent power to impose criminal punishment for violation of a duty owed to the federal
government” and that whatever inherent authority the states have with respect to immigration is
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issue. The majority opinion did say that “[t]he problems posed to
[Arizona] by illegal immigration must not be underestimated.”218 Yet
the majority opinion scrupulously avoided any reference to inherent
authority and never referred to Arizona as a sovereign
government.219 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, discussed inherent
authority.220
Justice Scalia’s dissent began and ended with the proposition
that each state, as an independent sovereign, has its own “inherent
power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those
limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed
by Congress.”221 The opinion caused immediate outrage among
commentators who seized upon this passage from Justice Scalia’s
dissent:
Notwithstanding “[t]he myth of an era of unrestricted
immigration” in the first 100 years of the Republic, the
States enacted numerous laws restricting the immigration of
certain classes of aliens, including convicted criminals,

limited to cooperation with federal enforcement. Brief for the United States at 27–31, 55 n.33,
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *17–18, *29. At oral argument, Paul
Clement (arguing for Arizona) never uttered the phrase “inherent authority,” or even “police
power.” Solicitor General Verrilli, true to the brief for the United States, argued that Section three
was preempted in part because “there is no state police power interest in that Federal registration
relationship.” Oral Argument at 58, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182).
218. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
219. Cf. id. at 2498 (finding federal government’s authority to control immigration stems in
part from its “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations”).
The majority opinion only referred to state “police power” in a general way at the outset of its
preemption analysis, id. at 2501, and one other time when citing its precedent in De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), as recognizing that “States possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Arizona, 132
S. Ct. at 2501, 2503. The latter reference, of course, was a far cry from a declaration that states
have inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws.
While the majority opinion failed to address “inherent authority” directly, it seems at least
true to say the Arizona majority did not share the vision of inherent authority expressed in the
2002 OLC memorandum, of the states as sovereign entities akin to foreign nations. After all, the
United States is not capable of “preempting” the police power of Canada. The Arizona majority,
however, had no difficulty concluding that whatever authority Arizona has over civil immigration
violations is subordinate to federal authority in that realm and must not conflict with or pose an
obstacle to federal authority. The Arizona opinion did not go so far, however, as the Ninth Circuit
had when it explicitly rejected the notion that Arizona possessed any inherent authority to enforce
civil immigration laws. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 362 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
220. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Id.
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indigents, persons with contagious diseases, and (in
Southern States) freed blacks. State laws not only provided
for the removal of unwanted immigrants but also imposed
penalties on unlawfully present aliens and those who aided
their immigration.222
But Justice Scalia’s reliance on slavery-era precedent did not
stop with a single reference to southern states excluding free African
Americans. His dissent was rife with “authorities” tracing whatever
validity they once had to the institution of slavery. 223 Justice Scalia
began with, ended with, and entirely depended upon a vision of the
Constitution that is, quite simply, the proslavery Constitution of the
antebellum Republic. The crux of the problem is that the authorities
relied upon by Justice Scalia cannot be disentangled from their
proslavery roots; they cannot be said to support an “immigration”
power in the states, since their purpose was partly to broker and
perpetuate the compromise between the slaveholding and free states
in the first century of the Nation’s existence.
Justice Scalia first held the power to control immigration arises
as an inherent aspect of state sovereignty: “[The] power to exclude
has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.”224 Justice
Scalia then pointed to several provisions of the Constitution he
argued were put in place to protect this sovereign “immigration”
power of the states.225 For example, Justice Scalia cited the
222. Id. at 2512 (citing Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835, 1841–80 (1993)); see also Ian Millhiser, Justice Scalia Cites ProSlavery Laws Excluding ‘Freed Blacks’ To Justify His Anti-Immigrant Opinion, THINKPROGRESS
(June 26, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/26/506191/justice-scalia-cites-proslavery-laws-excluding-freed-blacks-to-justify-his-anti-immigrant-opinion/ (criticizing the cited
passage in Justice Scalia’s dissent); Adam Serwer, Scalia Cites Slavery-Era Laws in Immigration
Dissent, MOTHER JONES (June 25, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/06/
immigration-law-dissent-scalia-reference-slavery-era-laws (describing the cited passage in Justice
Scalia’s dissent as one that “stood out from the rest”); Jeffrey Toobin, That’s Just Nino: Scalia’s
Arizona Dissent, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs
/comment/2012/06/antonin-scalia-dissent-immigration-arizona.html (noting that the cited
passage’s “invocation of that ugly chapter in American history suggests at a minimum, a loss of
perspective”). “Harkening back to the ‘good old days’ of the law of slavery impeaches his
position,” commented Professor Gabriel Chin. Ethan Bronner, A Dissent by Scalia Is Criticized as
Political, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/scaliasimmigration-dissent-is-criticized-as-political.html.
223. Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 2511.
225. Id. at 2511–12.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause226 as promoting the power of the
states to exclude.227 Whereas under the Articles of Confederation all
“inhabitants” of the states enjoyed the privileges and immunities of
the “free citizens in the several States,” under the Constitution the
privileges and immunities were reserved for citizens of the states.228
Of course, the reality is that this state “immigration” power was used
to regulate the African American population in the states. State
citizenship was unavailable to African Americans in the slave states
and ultimately, after Dred Scott,229 even to free African Americans in
the free states.230 The “immigration” power embodied in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was required, after the Civil War,
to be undone with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, which established a national citizenship
to which African Americans were granted access, and placed in the
national government the responsibility to protect the privileges and
immunities pertaining to that national citizenship.231
Justice Scalia also cited the Export Clause of the Constitution232
as “an acknowledgment of the States’ sovereign interest in protecting
their borders.”233 “[T]he States could exclude . . . dangerous or
unwholesome goods,” he wrote.234 But the importance of the Export
Clause was not in this power—for which the relationship to
immigration is uncertain and not clarified by Justice Scalia—but in
its identity as one provision among many in the great compromise
between the slaveholding and free states.235
226. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
227. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. Id. at 2512.
229. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
230. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 36 (1996).
231. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY 1886–1883 101–10 (Harold Hyman & Stuart
Bruchey eds., 1987); Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independence,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 729 n.178 (2012).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing it's inspection Laws.”).
233. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. Id.
235. See Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2003) (arguing that
“[w]ithout the protection the Export Clause provided to exporting states, particularly in the South,
the Constitutional Convention would have imploded.”); id. at 10–14 (detailing the connection
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Perhaps most appalling of all was Justice Scalia’s reference to
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. In this provision, Justice
Scalia found acknowledgment of an immigration power in both the
federal government and the states (subject to federal restriction):
“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight . . . .”236 Justice Scalia did not refer to this constitutional
provision by its common appellation and did not discuss the
importance of this clause—the Slave Trade Clause—in brokering the
constitutional compromise between slaveholding and free states.237
After setting forth his general argument that the immigration
power is inherent in state sovereignty, resting upon the historical
authorities discussed above, Justice Scalia considered the four
sections of S.B. 1070 in turn, finding each provision to be a
legitimate exercise of Arizona’s sovereign “power to exclude” not
preempted by federal legislation.238
Justice Scalia concluded with a vitriolic diatribe against the
federal immigration enforcement effort. The last decade saw an
“increasing tide of illegal border crossings into Arizona,” which
Justice Scalia suggested was the result of “unwise” targeting of funds
for immigration enforcement.239 Justice Scalia then railed against the
Obama administration’s recently announced plan to grant deferred
action to so-called “Dreamers”—noncitizens brought to the United
States before they turned sixteen who qualify for the program by
demonstrating, inter alia, participation in school or employment and

between slavery and the opposition of southern states in the Constitutional Convention to export
taxes); see also Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall’s Thesis on the
Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 121–22 (1989) (discussing the Export
Clause in terms of the North-South slavery compromise, while noting that Southern delegates
were concerned that exports produced by slave states would be taxed as a means of “in effect
tax[ing] slavery”); id. at 126 (arguing the “Framers of the Constitution . . . actively protected
Southern interests in slavery by their adoption of the 1808 clause, the fugitive slave clause, and
the export tax clauses, and . . . intended to protect slavery passively through the three-fifths
clause”).
236. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
22–26 (1981).
238. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Id. at 2520–21.
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the absence of a criminal record240—questioning President Obama’s
statement that it was “the right thing to do.”241
“[T]here has come to pass, and is with us today,” Justice Scalia
concluded,
the specter that Arizona and the States that support it
predicted: A Federal Government that does not want to
enforce the immigration laws as written, and leaves the
States’ borders unprotected against immigrants whom those
laws would exclude. So the issue is a stark one. Are the
sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive’s
refusal to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws?242
Justice Scalia’s final rhetorical question brought the argument
full circle. “Would the States conceivably have entered into the
Union if the Constitution itself contained the Court’s holding?”243
The answer to this question may well be “no.” But that may owe less
to the Framers’ insistence on reserving an immigration power to the
states than to the constitutional compromises that were brokered
between the states on the issue of slavery.244
III. THE LESSON OF ARIZONA:
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH LACKS THE POWER
TO ISSUE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS
What consequences will the Arizona decision have for the future
of immigration enforcement? One might assume Arizona will signal
240. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred
Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-processyoung-people-who-are-low.
241. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
remarks criticizing President Obama drew vast media attention. E.g., Ethan Bronner, A Dissent by
Scalia is Criticized as Political, NY TIMES, June 28, 2012 at A18; Jonathan Easley, Justice Scalia
Rips Obama’s Deportation Directive in Dissent on Arizona Case, HILL (June 25, 2012,
12:49PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/234571-justice-scalia-blasts-obamas
-deportation-directive. One columnist called for Justice Scalia to “free himself to pursue his true
vocation” (politics) by resigning. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Scalia Must Resign, WASH. POST (June 27,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jr-justice-scalia-should-resign/2012
/06/27/gJQApkO06V_story.html.
242. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243. Id. at 2522.
244. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 237, at 22–34 (noting that the issue of slavery
affected decisions on representation, taxation, commercial regulation, domestic tranquility, state
sovereignty, and interstate relations).
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the withdrawal of the states from immigration enforcement, though
the Court’s reliance on obstacle rather than field preemption may
send states back to the drawing board in an attempt to craft unpreempted immigration laws.245 But Arizona’s effects are not limited
to state efforts at immigration enforcement. In the rest of this Article,
I consider the implications of Arizona for one key federal
enforcement mechanism—the immigration detainer.
This part demonstrates that the executive branch lacks the power
it has asserted in its immigration detainer regulation. I first briefly
discuss the importance of detainers to the federal immigration
enforcement effort.246 The United States issues approximately
250,000 immigration detainers each year,247 and detainers are
perhaps the single key enforcement mechanism driving the record
numbers of deportations seen in recent years.
I then demonstrate that the Arizona Court’s analysis of S.B.
1070 shows that the immigration detainer system currently in use is
invalid for two reasons.
First, Arizona held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070 was preempted
because it authorized state officers to make immigration arrests
under circumstances where federal immigration officers were not so
empowered by Congress.248 Section 6, held the Court, was
inconsistent with “the system Congress created.”249 The detainer
regulation put in place by the executive branch suffers from that

245. Kevin Johnson, for example, has written,
the Supreme Court has cracked open the door to new state legislation, new claims of
racial discrimination, and new lawsuits. States are likely to test the boundaries of
Arizona v. United States with new, if not improved, immigration enforcement
legislation. Litigation over the constitutionality of the laws is likely to continue. The
lasting solution to the proliferation of state immigration enforcement laws, which is
beyond the power of the Supreme Court, is for Congress to enact comprehensive
immigration reform that has the support of the public. Perhaps the publicity over
Arizona v. United States will prod Congress to act. Until it does, we can expect the
status quo to continue.
Kevin Johnson, The Debate over Immigration Reform Is Not Over Until It’s Over, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 25,
2012),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-the-debate-overimmigration-reform-is-not-over-until-its-over/.
246. See infra Part II.A.
247. In fiscal year 2009, ICE’s Criminal Alien Program issued 234,939 detainers nationwide,
or approximately 20,000 per month. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY11 BUDGET IN BRIEF 63,
available at http://www.deportationnation.org/library/.
248. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
249. Id. at 2506.

Winter 2013]

ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES

675

same defect—it requires state officers to make immigration arrests in
circumstances well beyond the limited arrest authority Congress
granted to federal immigration officers. Because it exceeds the
“system Congress created,” the regulation is ultra vires.250
Second, while the Court upheld Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, it did
so by finding Section 2(B) to govern only communication. The Court
explicitly noted that prolonged detention to investigate immigration
status would raise constitutional concerns. Because the detainer
regulation goes beyond communication, and requires prolonged
detention, the Fourth Amendment issues the Justices avoided by
construing Section 2(B) as involving only communication are present
in the detainer regulation. The regulation is invalid to the extent it
raises these substantial constitutional issues.251
A. The Centrality of Detainers to
Federal Immigration Enforcement
The immigration detainer is the principle mechanism for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the immigration
enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),
to obtain custody over suspected immigration violators in the
custody of state or local law enforcement officials. When ICE learns
that a suspected immigration violator is in a state prison or local jail,
ICE lodges a detainer, or “Form I-247.”252
Federal immigration officials have long used immigration
detainers in cases where suspected immigration violators are in the
custody of local, state, or federal officials.253 Before 1987, an
immigration detainer served merely to notify jail or prison officials
of federal immigration officials’ interest in a prisoner and to request

250. See infra Part III.B.
251. See infra Part III.B.
252. The form detainer has been in existence since at least 1983. Immigration Forms, 54 Fed.
Reg. 39336-02, 39337 (Sept. 26, 1989) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 299) (referring to Form I247 with date of Mar. 1, 1983); Form I-247 (March 1, 1983) (on file with the author).
Historically, federal immigration officials would also lodge a copy of the immigration charging
documents with jail or prison officials, and these documents would be considered the equivalent
of a detainer. E.g., Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986); see
Jonathan E. Stempel, Custody Battle: The Force of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Detainers over Imprisoned Aliens, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 741, 742 n.11 (1990–1991).
253. See generally Lasch, supra note 21, at 182–85 (“In cases as far back as 1950, the
subjects of INS detainers have raised questions concerning this restraint on liberty.”).
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jail or prison officials to notify federal immigration officials before
releasing the targeted prisoner.254 In 1987, the executive branch
enacted federal regulations that required state and local lawenforcement agencies receiving an immigration detainer for a
prisoner to maintain custody of the prisoner for up to forty-eight
hours after his or her release date, in order to allow time for
immigration officials to arrive and take custody.255 Due to the
enactment of these regulations, the immigration detainer form no
longer requests only notice of a prisoner’s impending release;256 it
now purports to command state or local officials to maintain in their
custody a prisoner who otherwise would be released to freedom,257
and to deliver up that person to federal immigration officials. 258 State
and local officials regularly comply with immigration detainers by
continuing to hold prisoners who would otherwise be released.259

254. See Form I-247 (Mar. 1, 1983) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT
YOU: . . . Notify this office of the time of release at least 30 days prior to release or as much in
advance of release as possible.”); see also Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 743 n.1
(describing immigration detainer as “merely a method of advising the prison officials to notify the
I.N.S. of the petitioner’s release or transfer”).
255. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012); see generally Lasch, supra note 21, at 182–85 (describing the
history of the current regulatory regime).
256. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.
257. See Form I-247 (June 2011) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT
YOU: Maintain custody of the subject . . . beyond the time when the subject would otherwise
have been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take
custody of the subject.”).
258. See Form I-247 (Dec. 2012) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT
YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been
released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the subject. This request derives
from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.”); Form I-247 (Dec. 2011) (on file with the author) (“IT
IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED
48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject
would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the
subject. This request flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law
enforcement agency ‘shall maintain custody of an alien’ once a detainer has been issued by
DHS.”); Form I-247 (Aug. 2010) (on file with the author) (“Under Federal regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7, DHS requests that you maintain custody of this individual for a period not to exceed 48
hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for DHS to
assume custody of the alien.”); Form I-247 (Apr. 1, 1997) (on file with the author) (“Federal
regulations (8 C.F.R. § 287.7) require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for INS to assume
custody of the alien.”).
259. Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–74.
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Detainers have thus long been a key mechanism in the
immigration enforcement scheme.260 But the importance of detainers
to federal immigration enforcement was dramatically amplified in
March 2008, when the federal government launched an immigration
enforcement program called “Secure Communities.”261 The stated
purpose of the program is to focus on the deportation of immigrants
who commit serious crimes.262 The program targets prisoners who
are awaiting trial or serving sentences for local, state, or federal
crimes.263
The “cornerstone” of the “Secure Communities” program is
“interoperability”—the linking of federal crime, immigration, and
fingerprint databases.264 Routinely, local law enforcement officials
submit booking fingerprints to the FBI for criminal background
checks.265 Under “Secure Communities,” the FBI transmits these
fingerprints to DHS.266 DHS then determines which prisoners to
target for immigration enforcement267 and attempts to gain custody
over those prisoners through the use of immigration detainers—the
central enforcement tool for the “Secure Communities” program.268
“Secure Communities” vastly increased the use of immigration
detainers as an enforcement tool.269 With this increased use of
detainers, the number of deportations spiked.270
260. Id. at 174–77.
261. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New
Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/news
/releases/0804/080414washington.htm.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Buncombe, Henderson, and
Gaston Sheriffs' Offices in North Carolina Receive Full Interoperability Technology to Help
Identify Criminal Aliens, ICE (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0811/081118
charlotte.htm.
265. David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, 77
POLICE CHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 40, 43, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/C
PIM0910/index.php.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 43–44.
268. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/library
/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (“Detainers are critical for ICE to be able
to identify and ultimately remove criminal aliens who are currently in federal, state or local
custody.”).
269. Venturella, supra note 265, at 44.
270. In fiscal year 2011, “interoperability” was deployed in 937 new jurisdictions, resulting in
an increase of over 100,000 “matches” and nearly 30,000 additional deportations. SECURE
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Immigration detainers have not been immune from the broader
civil rights debates over immigration.271 Since its inception in March
2008, “Secure Communities” has come under fire from opponents
and has emerged as a major battleground in the civil-rights war being
waged over immigration. As opponents of state and local
enforcement of immigration laws have done, opponents of “Secure
Communities” argue that the enforcement program encourages racial
profiling, diverts local resources from crime control, and makes
communities less safe by discouraging immigrants from reporting
crimes or cooperating with police.272
Echoing these criticisms, some localities in recent years have
urged the disentanglement of local law enforcement from federal
immigration enforcement273 and have enacted measures to resist
immigration rendition by declining to subject prisoners to prolonged
detention pursuant to detainers.274 In Santa Clara County, California,
for example, the board of supervisors passed a resolution in June
2010 indicating a clear concern for the civil rights of immigrants.275
The resolution lauded the county as “home to a diverse and vibrant
community of people representing many races, ethnicities, and
nationalities, including immigrants from all over the world” and
opined that “laws like Arizona’s SB 1070 . . . subject individuals to
racial profiling.”276 The resolution affirmed the county’s

COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide
_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf.
271. See supra Part II.A.
272. E.g., Violeta R. Chapin, ¡Silencio! Undocumented Immigrant Witnesses and the Right to
Silence, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 152–54 (2011); Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR.
FORUM (2009), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Secure_Communities.pdf;
More Questions than Answers About Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2009),
http://v2011.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf.
273. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 2010-316 (adopted June 22, 2010)
[hereinafter Santa Clara 2010-316], available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/BoardResolution-2010-316(6-22-2010).pdf.
274. Some activity has occurred at the state level as well, with legislation limiting detainer
compliance enacted in both Connecticut and California. 2013 Conn. Acts 13-155 (Reg. Sess.),
available
at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155-R00HB-06659-PA.pdf
(concerning civil immigration detainers); Patrick McGreevy, Signing Trust Act Is Another IllegalImmigration Milestone for Brown, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lame-brown-immigration-20131006,0,5441798.story.
275. Santa Clara 2010-316.
276. Id.
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commitment to protect all of its residents from “discrimination,
abuse, violence, and exploitation.”277 Ultimately, after extended
unsuccessful efforts by Santa Clara County to “opt out” of the
“Secure Communities” program,278 the board of supervisors passed a
measure ending Santa Clara’s routine compliance with detainers.279
In Cook County, Illinois, an ordinance was enacted requiring the
sheriff to “decline ICE detainer requests unless there is a written
agreement with the federal government by which all costs incurred
by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be
reimbursed.”280 When the ordinance drew a proposal from the federal
government to pay the costs of detention,281 the civil rights issues
underlying the ordinance became ascendant, with the Cook County
Board president declaring, “[e]qual justice before the law is more
important to me than the budgetary considerations.”282
Similar resistance to immigration detainers, grounded in civil
rights concerns, was seen in other urban centers. In Chicago, Mayor
Rahm Emanuel introduced his “Welcoming City” antidetainer
ordinance,283 claiming it would “‘prevent law abiding Chicagoans

277. Id.
278. Memorandum from Miguel Marquez, Cnty. Counsel, on U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s Secure Communities Program to Public Safety and Justice Committee (Dec. 2,
2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/9-PSJC-memo-12-2-10.PDF.
279. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 2011-504 (adopted Oct. 18, 2011)
(resolving to decline compliance with immigration detainers unless the federal government
agreed to pay the costs of detention, and then only if the prisoner was convicted of a serious crime
and in no case would Santa Clara County comply with a detainer request for a juvenile).
280. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE § 46-37 (2011) (enacted by Ordinance No. 11-O-73 (Sept. 7,
2011)).
281. Antonio Olivo, Feds Seek Compromise on Cook County Immigration Ordinance:
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Offers To Pay For Detainer of Suspected Illegal
Immigrants Who've Posted Bail, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2012-02-29/news/ct-met-cook-county-immigration-ordinance-0229-20120229_1_illegalimmigrants-ice-detainers-immigration-enforcement-agency.
282. Hal Dardick, Preckwinkle Ices ICE proposal: Rejects Call For Working Group to
Resolve Issues, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-10/news
/ct-met-toni-preckwinkle-0411-20120411_1_preckwinkle-detainers-immigration-status.
283. The ordinance bars compliance with detainers except in cases involving major crimes,
outstanding criminal warrants, or gang members. CHI., IL., MUN. CODE ch 2-173 (2012),
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/SO2012-4984.pdf.
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from being unfairly detained and deported.’”284 Other jurisdictions
have adopted similar legislation or policies.285
Litigation has sprouted as well, challenging the validity of
detainer practices.286
284. John Presta, Mayor Emanuel Introduces Ordinance to Make Chicago an ImmigrantFriendly City, EXAMINER.COM (July 11, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/mayor-emanuel
-introduces-ordinance-to-make-chicago-an-immigrant-friendly-city.
285. On the local level, these jurisdictions include Alameda County (California), Milwaukee
County (Wisconsin), and the cities of Berkeley (California), New York (New York), New
Orleans (Louisiana), Newark (New Jersey), San Francisco (California), and the District of
Columbia. Letter from Richard Valle, Supervisor, Dist. 2, Cnty. of Alameda, Cal., to the Bd. of
Supervisors, Cnty. of Alameda, Cal. (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.acgov.org/board/
bos_calendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg_04_23_13/BOARDS%20COMMISSION/Set%20Matt
er%20Calendar/BOS_Approve_a_resolution_regarding_ICE_Civil_Detainer_Requests.pdf
(seeking approval of Alameda County Board of Supervisors, Resolution No. R-2013-142, File
No. 28853); Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, A Resolution Establishing Milwaukee
County Policy with Respect to Honoring Detainer Requests from U.S. Department of Homeland
Security—Immigration and Customs Enforcement, MILWAUKEE COUNTY LEGISLATIVE
INFORMATION CENTER (June 4, 2012), https://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.as
px?ID=1124069&GUID=3D583485-4F01-4B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF&Options=&Search=;
Berkeley City Council, Regular Meeting Annotated Agenda, CITY OF BERKELEY (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2012/10Oct/City_Council__10-30-2012_%E2
%80%93_Regular_Meeting_Annotated_Agenda.aspx; Mirela Iverac, City Limits Cooperation
with Federal Immigration Officials at Rikers, WNYC NEWS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2011/nov/22/city-limits-cooperation-ice-rikers/;
Campbell Robertson, New Orleans and U.S. in Standoff on Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/new-orleans-and-us-in-standoff-on-detentions.ht
ml?_r=0 (detailing New Orleans policy limiting detainer compliance that “came about for a
variety of reasons, including a lawsuit filed in federal court in 2011 by two men who had spent
months in Orleans Parish Prison on expired detention requests”); James Queally, Newark Police
First in N.J. to Refuse to Detain Undocumented Immigrants Accused of Minor Crimes, NJ.COM
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/08/newark_police_first_in_nj_to_
refuse_to_detain_illegal_immigrants_accused_of_minor_crimes.html;
Brent
Begin,
San
Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold Inmates for ICE, S.F. EXAMINER, May 6, 2011,
http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/san-francisco-county-jail-wont-hold-inmates-forice/Content?oid=2174504 (describing policy adopted by San Francisco Sheriff Michael
Hennessey); PHIL MENDELSON, COUNCIL OF THE D.C. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON
BILL 19-585, “IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012” (May 8,
2012), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20120604161227.pdf. State-level
resistance has occurred in Connecticut, Ct. Public Act 13-155 (June 6, 2013), available at
http://openstates.org/ct/bills/2013/HB6659/, and has been proposed in California, Florida, and
Massachusetts, Assemb. B. 4, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://
openstates.org/ca/bills/20132014/AB4/; S.B. 730, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at
http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/documents/FLD00015779/; H.B. 1613, 188th Leg. (Mass.
2013), available at http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/documents/FLD00015779/.
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B. “Not the System Congress Created”:
The Detainer Regulation Is Ultra Vires
This part details the inconsistencies between the federal detainer
regulation that the executive branch created in the late 1980s and the
comprehensive immigration enforcement system that “Congress
created.”
It may seem odd that a “preemption” case like Arizona, which is
ostensibly focused on the conflict between federal and state law,
should have any bearing on the legality of immigration detainers. An
immigration detainer is, after all, an explicit request by the federal
government for state or local help in immigration enforcement.287
How could preemption analysis have any bearing on the legality of
detainers, when detainers are issued by federal authorities?
The answer is that there is an area of correspondence between
the question of whether state law is preempted by federal law and the
question of whether regulations implemented by the executive
branch are ultra vires of a congressional grant of authority. The
analysis of both issues focuses, in the first instance, on congressional
intent and a consideration of the clarity with which Congress has
announced its intent.
Both field and obstacle preemption analyses begin with a
consideration of the intent of Congress. Field preemption asks
whether Congress “inten[ded] to displace state law altogether.”288
Obstacle preemption requires “examining the federal statute as a
whole” to determine Congress’s “purpose and intended effects.”289 In
both types of preemption analysis, courts are cautioned against
finding state laws preempted “‘unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’”290

286. E.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp.
2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. filed Feb. 13, 2012);
Reply Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv05452 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 25, 2012).
287. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
288. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
289. Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
290. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).
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Similarly, in considering whether executive regulation is ultra
vires of statutory authority, the first step of the familiar Chevron
analysis is to ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”291
The preemption analysis of the Arizona Court thus involved
ascertaining, through an examination of Congress’s enactments in
the field of immigration enforcement, the direction and magnitude of
congressional intent. This analysis can equally function as the first
step in the Chevron analysis, as applied to the detainer regulation:
Has Congress292 “directly spoken to the precise question at issue”?
As is shown below, Congress has spoken directly to the question of
immigration arrests and has carefully delineated federal, state, and
local power in this regard. Congress has also directly legislated with
respect to immigration detainers.
The Arizona decision discussed and delineated “the system
Congress created.” Just as Congress held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070
conflicted with this statutory system, equally so does the immigration
detainer regulation conflict with Congress’s system.293 Whereas the
preemption analysis employed by the Court examines whether the
states have exercised more authority than is consistent with the

291. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
The Administrative Procedure Act allows a challenge to agency regulations that are “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006).
292. Executive branch regulations are sometimes considered in the preemption analysis. One
way that regulations may be considered is as evidence of Congress’s intent. See, e.g., R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., N.C., 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986) (“[A]s part of the preemption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field
completely.”). Because the Arizona decision focused almost exclusively on Congress’s statutory
enactments in determining the preemption issue, the complex issues surrounding “agency
preemption” are not at play. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,
330 (1994)); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 526 n.14
(2012) (and authorities cited therein). Indeed, the Arizona opinion demonstrates some hostility to
“agency preemption”—making clear that the executive does not set immigration policy. In its
analysis of Section 2(B) the Court looked to Congress’s statutory scheme in determining that “the
federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine
matter,” dispensing with the argument of the United States that such routine contact would
undermine federal immigration policy (as set by the executive branch). Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2508.
293. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
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congressional statutory scheme, the question in the Chevron analysis
is whether the executive branch has exercised excessive authority.294
1. “Not The System Congress Created”
As noted above, until the 1980s, immigration detainers were
nothing more than a request for advance notification before the
release of a prisoner.295 Beginning in 1987,296 the executive branch
implemented regulations requiring officials receiving an immigration
detainer to maintain custody of a prisoner who would otherwise be
released.297 The current version of the regulation provides:
Upon a determination by the Department to issue a
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit
assumption of custody by the Department.298

294. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
295. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
297. Whether an immigration detainer operates to require officials to maintain custody over a
prisoner who would otherwise be released, or only to request that officials maintain custody, has
been a matter of some confusion. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RES. SERVICE, IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 11–14 (Aug. 31, 2012) (detailing authorities supporting the position
that the detainer is a request and authorities supporting the position that the detainer is a
command). Some language in the detainer regulation itself seems to suggest that the detainer is
only a request for advance notification of a prisoner’s upcoming release. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a)
(2012) (“A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks
custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and
removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to
release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when
gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.”). However, the
language of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) is clear and unmistakable in requiring that officials prolong
custody of a prisoner subject to an immigration detainer. See C.F.R. § 287.7(d); Rios-Quiroz v.
Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of
“shall” in 8 CFR § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state officials).
298. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). The regulation in its entirety provides:
§ 287.7 DETAINER PROVISIONS UNDER SECTION 287(D)(3) OF THE ACT.
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the
Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue a
Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or
local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement
agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that
agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request
that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the
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The detainer regulation indicates no prerequisites to the issuance of a
detainer299 and authorizes issuance of a detainer “at any time.”300
The regulation runs headlong into the statutory “system
Congress created” in two ways. First, the regulation permits federal
immigration officials, through the use of a detainer issued to other
“criminal justice” officials, to effectuate arrests in circumstances
beyond the statutory arrest authority Congress bestowed on those
federal immigration officials. In doing so, the executive branch has
exceeded Congress’s grant of authority, according to the Court’s
logic in Arizona.301
Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate
physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.
(b) Authority to issue detainers. The following officers are authorized to issue
detainers:
(1) Border patrol agents, including aircraft pilots;
(2) Special agents;
(3) Deportation officers;
(4) Immigration inspectors;
(5) Adjudications officers;
(6) Immigration enforcement agents;
(7) Supervisory and managerial personnel who are responsible for
supervising the activities of those officers listed in this paragraph; and
(8) Immigration officers who need the authority to issue detainers
under section 287(d)(3) of the Act in order to effectively accomplish
their individual missions and who are designated individually or as a
class, by the Commissioner of CBP, the Assistant Secretary for ICE, or
the Director of the BCIS.
(c) Availability of records. In order for the Department to accurately determine the
propriety of issuing a detainer, serving a notice to appear, or taking custody of an
alien in accordance with this section, the criminal justice agency requesting such
action or informing the Department of a conviction or act that renders an alien
inadmissible or removable under any provision of law shall provide the Department
with all documentary records and information available from the agency that
reasonably relates to the alien's status in the United States, or that may have an
impact on conditions of release.
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by the
Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to
exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit
assumption of custody by the Department.
(e) Financial responsibility for detention. No detainer issued as a result of a
determination made under this chapter I shall incur any fiscal obligation on the part
of the Department, until actual assumption of custody by the Department, except as
provided in paragraph (d) of this section.
§ 287.7.
299. See § 287.7(a)–(e).
300. § 287.7(a).
301. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505–10 (2012).
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From the Court’s discussion of Section 2(B), it is clear that
prolonged detention, such as that explicitly required by the detainer
regulation, operates as an arrest. The Court was clear that
“[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status
would raise constitutional concerns.”302 In the Court’s view, Section
2(B) avoided those constitutional concerns because the status check
was presumed to take place “during the course of an authorized,
lawful detention or after a detainee has been released.”303 Section
2(B) was thus deemed to be principally about communication, not
detention.
The immigration detainer regulation, unlike Section 2(B),
explicitly calls for prolonged detention—directing the criminal
justice agency receiving a detainer to “maintain custody” of a
prisoner who is “not otherwise detained.”304 The immigration
detainer’s forty-eight-hour holding period thus begins to run only
once the criminal justice agency has lost all other justifications for
holding the prisoner.305
That prolonged detention beyond the termination of an
otherwise lawful detention would be a “seizure” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment is clear from the Arizona opinions.306 The
majority opinion upheld Section 2(B) precisely because it was
limited to involve only communication and not a prolonged
detention. Justice Alito conceded that prolonged detention amounting
to a new arrest would require probable cause of a new crime beyond
that for which the prisoner was already in custody (and released).307
302. Id. at 2509.
303. Id.
304. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
305. See id.
306. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct at 2509; id. at 2528–29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Pending lawsuits have raised this claim that immigration detainers run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint at 1, Brizuela v.
Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. filed Feb. 13, 2012); Reply in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. filed
Jan. 25, 2012).
307. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) and describing Hayes as “holding that the line
between detention and arrest is crossed ‘when the police, without probable cause or a warrant,
forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport
him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes’”). The
continued jailing of a prisoner who is otherwise free to return home surely constitutes a seizure
requiring probable cause. See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816–17.
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The issuance of immigration detainers is not restricted to
circumstances under which immigration officials are entitled to make
an arrest. Therefore, it is important that an immigration detainer acts
as an arrest of a prisoner who would otherwise be released. As the
Court pointed out in striking down Section 6, immigration officials
may effect an immigration arrest either (1) pursuant to an
immigration arrest warrant308 or (2) in limited circumstances when

308. One possible argument is that a detainer is a specific example of the “arrest warrant”
authority Congress granted to the Attorney General in Section 236(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. In litigation, the United States has pointed to Section 236(a) as a possible source
of authority for the detainer regulation. Federal Defendants’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 13–16, Comm. for Immigrant
Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. County of Sonoma, No. 3:08-cv-04220-RS, (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28,
2009). But the use of detainers as arrest warrants would raise a serious constitutional concern.
While the Court has upheld the authority of federal immigration officials to detain suspected
immigration violators pending an adjudication of their status, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
523–30 (2003) (distinguishing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (involving “detention
pending a determination of removability”)), the Court has not endorsed the use of arrest warrants
to investigate a person’s immigration status. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975)
(holding “[t]he impropriety of the arrest was obvious” where detectives admitted the arrest was
for investigation). Arrests for investigation only would implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.
Yet what evidence is available indicates detainers are often placed for no stated reason other than
investigation. See Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–82. The INA provisions allowing warrantless
arrests have been interpreted as requiring probable cause. United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494,
496 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The words of the statute ‘reason to believe’ are properly taken to signify
probable cause.”) (citing Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217,
222 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 223 (“[S]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by
the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate
must be controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law
enforcement officials.”). Similarly, Section 236(a) should be read as imposing a probable cause
requirement before issuance of an administrative arrest warrant. Since the detainer regulation
involves no probable cause requirement, it cannot be characterized as an arrest warrant.
Furthermore, such a characterization would be inconsistent with practice. Current regulations
delineate a different set of immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants from the set
authorized to issue detainers. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2012) (discussing arrest warrant
authority), with 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b) (discussing detainer authority). It appears that some lowerlevel officials who lack the authority to issue arrest warrants are authorized to issue detainers.
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(2) (authorizing “special agents” to issue detainers), with 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.5(e)(2)(xxix)–(xxxiii) (authorizing only various types of “special agents in charge” to issue
arrest warrants); compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(3) (authorizing “deportation officers” to issue
detainers), with 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2)(xxv) (only authorizing “supervisory deportation officers”
to issue arrest warrants). Additionally, the Form I-247 detainer form indicates one reason a
detainer may be issued is pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, indicating the two are not
synonymous. See Form I-247, October 2011 (on file with the author). Furthermore, had Congress
intended detainers to be warrants, it would not have used both terms in the INA. Compare
Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (using “warrant”), with
Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (using “detainer”).
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the person is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”309
The detainer regulation requires neither of these prerequisites. Thus,
detainers can be issued in circumstances well beyond those in which
immigration officials can make an arrest. The detainer regulation,
just like Section 6, goes beyond the statutory “system Congress
created.”310
It might be argued that persons detained in the custody of a law
enforcement agency should be presumed a flight risk, and therefore
“likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”311 While this
argument might have force in a particular case, it sweeps too broadly
to justify the detainer regulation, which does not preclude detainers
being placed in circumstances where immigration officials clearly
can obtain a warrant before the prisoner’s release.312 Had Congress

309. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)). The Court did not explicitly
note the other important requirement of § 1357—that an immigration official making a
warrantless arrest have “reason to believe” the arrestee has violated federal immigration law. See
id. Courts have construed the “reason to believe” requirement as importing a probable cause
requirement in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1608 & n.229 (2010).
The Court also ignored a statutory provision directing the Attorney General to take into
custody certain aliens who are deportable or inadmissible by virtue of criminal convictions or acts
of terrorism. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). This statutory provision (cited only in Justice Alito’s opinion,
see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2533–34 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)), requires more than probable cause, since it is only triggered in the case of an alien who is
deportable or inadmissible. Id. The statute also requires the Attorney General to take custody of
such a person “when the alien is released”—which courts have interpreted as a limitation on
Congress’s command. Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 14–16 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the
“when released” provision limits the statute’s applicability to only those instances when the alien
is released from detention on the crimes which render him or her deportable or inadmissible);
Thomas v. Hogan, No. 1:08-CV-0417, 2008 WL 4793739, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2008)
(holding the same). The detainer regulation fails to track the specific requirements of this
statutory provision and therefore is inconsistent with the “system Congress created” when
considering this provision as well.
310. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2496.
311. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)).
312. The case of John Henry demonstrates that immigration officials lodging an immigration
detainer may well have ample time to obtain a warrant. Henry v. Chertoff, 317 Fed. App’x. 178,
179–80 (3d Cir. 2009). Mr. Henry was serving a 262-month sentence in federal prison when he
sought to challenge an immigration detainer placed against him. Id. at 179. He filed his habeas
petition in June 2008, alleging he was a United States citizen. Id. The district court dismissed Mr.
Henry’s habeas petition on the grounds he was not “in custody” pursuant to the detainer for
purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Id. After Mr. Henry filed his appellate brief, he was released from
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, on August 22, 2008. Id. at 179 n.2. Thus, Mr. Henry was in
custody for approximately two months while the detainer was lodged. Surely immigration
officials could have obtained a warrant for Mr. Henry’s arrest during that time. Given that there is
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statutorily determined that prisoners are categorically to be
considered flight risks, there might be something to this argument.
For example, the no-bail provisions of the INA have been upheld on
the ground that Congress reasonably concluded that persons
convicted of certain enumerated crimes posed a flight risk and should
therefore be detained during their removal proceedings. 313 But in the
case of detainers, there is no requirement that the target of the
detainer has been convicted of any crime. Nor is there a requirement
that the target of the detainer be subject to removal proceedings.314
Second, to the extent the detainer regulation purports to
authorize or compel state and local law enforcement to make such
arrests, the regulation runs afoul of Congress’s limited allocation of
immigration enforcement power to state officials. As the Court
discussed in finding Section 6 preempted, Congress has specifically
granted immigration enforcement authority to state officials only in
narrow circumstances—most notably when local officials participate
in a so-called 287(g) agreement. Enforcement beyond those narrow
circumstances is preempted. Because the detainer regulation calls for
state and local officials to participate in civil immigration
enforcement beyond those narrow circumstances, it is inconsistent
with the “system Congress created.”315
However, the Court qualified its discussion of Section 6 by
noting that Section 6 authorized the “unilateral decision of state
officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request,
approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.”316 The
detainer regulation, one could argue, looks less like the unilateral
state action of Section 6 found preempted in Arizona and more like
what the Arizona Court found Section 6 not to be: “cooperat[ion]
with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension,
nothing in the detainer regulation to limit the use of detainers to circumstances other than those
like Mr. Henry’s, there is no reason to believe a suspected immigration violator’s current
imprisonment makes the person “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” Indeed, in
many instances the person will be less likely to escape—as was true for Mr. Henry—because he
or she is imprisoned.
313. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–22.
314. Even if the presence of a person in custody could suffice to meet categorically the
“likely to escape” requirement for a warrantless arrest, the detainer regulation would still fail for
lack of a probable cause requirement. See Dardick, supra note 282.
315. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
316. Id. at 2507.
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detention or removal” of immigration violators.317 Detainers are,
after all, initiated by the federal government.
This argument would have more force if the immigration
detainer regulation had been phrased in terms of cooperation. After
all, as the Court pointed out, there is nothing inhibiting
communication between law enforcement agencies and federal
immigration officials; indeed, it is encouraged.318 But while there has
been much debate over whether immigration detainers are federal
government requests for cooperation or commands for
compliance,319 it is hard to see how the mandatory language of the
detainer regulation, which states that a criminal justice agency
receiving an immigration detainer “shall maintain custody” over the
prisoner,320 is consistent with Congress’s limited allowance for state
and local “cooperat[ion] with the Attorney General”321 in
immigration enforcement.322
Even if the regulation called only for cooperation, it is not clear
from the Arizona opinion that the cooperation statutorily authorized
by Congress would include making civil immigration arrests. The
Court mentioned that such cooperation might include “operational
support in executing a warrant,”323 but the Court elsewhere took
317. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006).
318. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)). Congress has not only
legislated to encourage such communication. Congress has made it unlawful to prevent such
communication. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State,
or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any
way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or
in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States.”).
319. See MANUEL, supra note 297, at 11–14 (2012) (detailing authorities in support of
position that detainer is a request and authorities in support of position that detainer is a
command).
320. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012).
321. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).
322. See Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of “shall” in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) renders the regulation
mandatory upon state officials). Because the detainer purports to command state and local
officials to act, it raises significant Tenth Amendment problems. See infra Part III.C.2.
323. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE ON STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED
MATTERS 13–14 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-
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pains to note that immigration warrants “are executed by federal
officers who have received training in the enforcement of
immigration law.”324 The Court also specifically noted that state and
local officials are required to receive such training when they enter
into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government,325 and it is
reasonable to conclude from the Court’s discussion that state and
local officials would be preempted from actually effectuating
immigration arrests (as contrasted to providing “operational
support”326) absent a 287(g) agreement and the training it requires.
The final argument in support of the detainer regulation involves
a statute discussed only in passing in the Arizona decision—Section
287(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—which I consider in
the next section.
2. The Detainer System Congress Did Authorize
The only use of the word “detainer” in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) is in Section 287(d), enacted as part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.327 The statutory provision allows
assistance-immigration-enforcement.pdf). In discussing what might constitute “cooperation”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), the majority explicitly mentioned immigration detainers. The
Court’s citation to immigration detainers as an example of state officers assisting federal
immigration officials is discussed below. See infra notes 339–342 and accompanying text.
324. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(b); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3)).
325. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)).
326. The Arizona majority cited a DHS publication to support the notion that “provid[ing]
operational support in exe-cuting a warrant” would be an example of state-federal “cooperation”
under INA § 287(g)(10). Id. at 2507. But the examples of such “operational support” given in the
DHS document are “providing tactical officers to join the federal officials during higher risk
operations, or providing perimeter security for the operation (e.g., blocking off public streets)”—
not making actual arrests. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 323, at 13. The DHS document
only envisions state and local officers actually seizing a person “[w]here independent state or
local law grounds provide a basis for doing so” and then only “at the request of DHS immigration
officers where the seizure or stop would aid an ongoing federal investigation into possible
violations of federal immigration law.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 323, at 13.
327. Section 287(d) provides:
DETAINER OF ALIENS FOR VIOLATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS.
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law enforcement
official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, if the official (or
another official)—
(1) has reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to the
United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States,
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or employee of the Service
authorized and designated by the Attorney General of the arrest and of facts
concerning the status of the alien, and
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federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to request federal
immigration officials “to determine promptly whether or not to issue
a detainer to detain the alien.”328 Because this statute does authorize
some use of immigration detainers, it is important to examine
Section 287(d) to determine whether it can support the executive
branch’s detainer regulation.
Problems immediately arise given the limitations on the detainer
authority that might be granted under Section 287(d). The statute is
explicitly limited to cases involving controlled substance arrests.329
Furthermore, the request for a detainer must be made by the arresting
agency, and then only when there is “reason to believe” (a standard
equating to probable cause)330 the arrestee is an immigration
violator.331 The executive branch’s detainer regulation exceeds the
narrow scope of INA Section 287(d), authorizing the issuance of a
detainer by “[a]ny authorized immigration officer . . . at any time.”332
The federal government’s litigation position has been that its
authority to issue detainers is neither generated nor constrained by
Section 287(d);333 rather, detainers stem from the federal

(3) requests the Service to determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer to
detain the alien, the officer or employee of the Service shall promptly determine
whether or not to issue such a detainer. If such a detainer is issued and the alien is
not otherwise detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney General
shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006).
328. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(3).
329. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
330. United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The words of the statute
‘reason to believe’ are properly taken to signify probable cause.”) (citing Au Yi Lau v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d
at 223 (“[S]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with
citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate must be controlled by the constitutional
standards governing similar detentions made by other law enforcement officials.”).
331. For a more detailed argument on these points, see Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–82.
332. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2012).
333. One federal district court has agreed with this interpretation. In Comm. for Immigrant
Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009), the district
court concluded that the regulation was not ultra vires of its enabling legislation. Id. at 1198. The
court first concluded that the detainer statute (INA § 287(d)) was not meant to limit the situations
in which the federal government might issue a detainer—rather, the detainer statute was meant to
impose additional requirements on the federal government in controlled substance cases (the
statute requires federal immigration officials to “promptly determine whether or not to issue such
a detainer” upon request in such cases). Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)). Legislative history not
cited by the court or the parties supports the court’s conclusion. 132 CONG. REC. 22,981 (1986)
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government’s general authority to take immigration violators into
custody. But the general authority relied on by the federal
government has been circumscribed by Congress in ways
inconsistent with the detainer regulation’s sweeping language.334
Section 287(d), with its own constraints, cannot save the regulation
and its broad authority to detain from exceeding Congress’s statutory
authorization.
It might be argued that Congress did intend to grant civil arrest
authority to state officials in narrow circumstances through the
detainer provision it enacted in Section 287(d), just as Congress did
later with Section 287(g). The specific description of a “detainer to
detain the alien” implies that the detainer will actually serve to detain
its target. Furthermore, the provision arguably avoids Fourth and
Tenth Amendment issues by requiring initiation of the detainer
process by the arresting law enforcement agency (rather than
allowing federal immigration authorities to initiate the detainer
process by commanding state or local agencies to hold a prisoner in
custody) and only upon “reason to believe” that the prisoner is an
immigration violator.335
Yet, even if Section 287(d) could be read as granting civil arrest
authority to state and local officers, the executive branch’s detainer
regulation exceeds the scope of that statutory authority.
Furthermore, the better reading is that Congress meant the word
“detainer” in Section 287(d) in the sense in which immigration
(indicating the provision for detainers in INA § 287(d) was added in response to “local law
enforcement complaints concerning the INS’ inability to issue a judgment on a suspect’s
citizenship status fast enough to allow the authorities to continue to detain him,” and was
intended to mandate a faster response from federal immigration authorities to requests initiated by
local law enforcement).
334. See supra Part III.A (noting that immigration officials are statutorily empowered to
arrest only when they have a warrant, INA § 236(a), probable cause, INA § 287(a)(2), (4), (5), or
certain knowledge of a person’s deportability or inadmissibility, INA § 236(c)).
335. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Tenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment issues
presented by the immigration detainer regulation). It seems odd, given Congress’s low estimation
of state and local officials’ competency with respect to immigration, that Congress would have
entrusted those officials, rather than federal immigration officials, with the probable cause
determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(b) (requiring training and supervision as a prerequisite to a
grant of immigration enforcement authority to state and local officials). A more likely explanation
is that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) simply indicates the circumstances under which state and local officials
should contact federal immigration officials for a detainer—not in every arrest involving
controlled substances, but only the subset of controlled substance arrests in which there is reason
to believe the arrestee may be present without authorization.
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detainers had been used until that time—as a request for notice of
impending release, not as a command for continued detention. The
Form I-247 detainer in use prior to the enactment of Section 287(d)
clearly announced that it was a request only for advance notice.
There are at least three reasons to interpret Section 287(d) as
using the word “detainer” as it had been used in the immigration
field prior to its enactment. First, this interpretation is consistent with
available legislative history indicating Section 287(d) did not create
any new detainer authority, but only created an obligation for federal
immigration officials to respond to other law enforcement agencies’
requests for prompt action.336 Second, as the federal government has
argued, the language of Section 287(d) seems too obscure to have
been intended as a grant of otherwise nonexistent arrest authority337
and is better read as imposing special requirements on an already
existing detainer authority. Third, the Arizona Court read Section
287(d) as authorizing communication—not arrest—by state and local
officials.338
Indeed, the Arizona Court’s single reference to Section 287(d) is
telling. In rejecting the argument that civil immigration arrests under
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 should be upheld under the “cooperation”
provision of Section 287(g), the Court cited Section 287(d) as an
example of cooperation. The majority described Section 287(d) as
allowing “State officials . . . [to] assist the Federal Government by
responding to requests for information about when an alien will be
released from their custody.”339 Characterizing Section 287(d) as
authorizing communication, rather than arrest, directly supports an
interpretation of Section 287(d) as embodying the existing detainer
practice, which had been nothing more than information sharing
between the federal, state, and local agencies.

336. 132 CONG. REC. 22,981 (1986). This legislative history also tends to undermine any
argument that Congress crafted Section 287(d) to avoid Tenth Amendment concerns by requiring
initiation of the detainer process by the arresting agency. The legislative history indicates 287(d)
was meant to require the federal government to be responsive to state and local agencies—hence
the language indicating initiation of the process at the arresting agency level.
337. See Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty., 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (“[T]he court
reads the language of § 1357 as simply placing special requirements on officials issuing detainers
for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances.”).
338. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012).
339. Id.
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In characterizing immigration detainers as communication rather
than arrests, the Court implicitly rejected the brief for the United
States, which offered a broad characterization of state cooperation
with respect to detainers. The United States suggested immigration
detainers were an example of arrests made as part of “cooperative
enforcement”:
Such broad and unilateral arrest authority also is not
necessary to facilitate true cooperative enforcement. State
and local officials (including in Arizona) have long made
arrests at the request of federal immigration officials, and
federal officials may place detainers on aliens who are
wanted by DHS but who otherwise would be released from
state or local custody.340
Tellingly, the United States cited the detainer regulation and not
the statute.341 The regulation clearly authorizes—indeed compels—
prolonged detention amounting to an arrest by state or local officials.
The statute is not clear, and the United States has argued elsewhere
that it does not constrain or generate authority to detain.342
The Arizona majority failed to accept the characterization of
detainers as arrests, instead viewing detainers as a “request[] for
information about when an alien will be released from [state or local]
custody.”343 This view of detainers tracked precisely the historical
use of detainers prior to the adoption of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Perhaps
because the immigration detainer regulation flies directly in the face
of the statutory system just delineated by the Court—the “system that
Congress created”—the Court did not cite the regulation. Instead, it
cited the detainer statute, endorsing the view that the statute simply
authorizes the use of detainers for cooperative enforcement by
allowing local officials not to arrest suspected immigration violators
but to advise federal immigration officials of their impending release.

340. Brief for the United States at 54, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL
939048 at *54 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.7).
341. Id.
342. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
343. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)).
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3. Conclusion:
The Immigration Detainer Is
Nothing More than a Request for Information
The Supreme Court in Arizona held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070
was preempted because it created a system for immigration
enforcement that was “not the system Congress created.”344 The
same is true of the executive branch’s detainer regulation, and the
specific conflicts between it and Congress’s statutory scheme cause
it equally to be an obstacle to Congress’s enforcement plan. The
regulation must be held to be beyond Congress’s statutory authority.
The statutory scheme that Congress did put in place for immigration
detainers is consistent with historical practice—the detainer is issued
by federal immigration officials and acts only as a request for notice
before the prisoner, who is the target of the detainer, is released from
custody. The detainer does not bind the receiving agency in any way.
C. The Detainer Regulation
Is Invalid Because It Raises
Substantial Constitutional Problems
Agency regulations cannot stand if they raise serious
constitutional doubts.345 Congress is assumed to legislate in light of
constitutional limitations, and therefore Congress cannot be assumed
to have intended an agency regulation that raises grave and uncertain
constitutional questions.346
The executive branch’s detainer regulation raises substantial
constitutional questions. The regulation raises Fourth Amendment
questions because there is no requirement of probable cause prior to
prolonged detention pursuant to a detainer. Additionally, there is no
requirement that a person held pursuant to a detainer be taken before
a neutral magistrate within forty-eight hours absent extraordinary

344. Id. at 2496.
345. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(b) (permitting challenge to regulations that are “contrary to
constitutional right”); see also Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1944
(2008) (citing SWANCC) (“Any regulation that raises constitutional doubts is invalid unless
Congress clearly authorized that result.”); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187,
244 & n.244 (2006) (citing Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172−73 (2001)).
346. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190−91 (1991) (citations omitted).
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circumstances. The regulation also raises a substantial Tenth
Amendment question because the regulation purports to allow
federal officials to command state and local officials to detain
prisoners in violation of the anti-commandeering principle.
1. The Detainer Regulation Raises Substantial Fourth Amendment
Problems
“I agree with the Court that individuals cannot be detained
solely to verify their immigration status,” President Barack Obama
said upon learning of the Arizona decision.347 Yet, immigration
detainers issued by federal immigration officials routinely do just
that.
The detainer regulation commands state and local officials to
maintain custody over a suspected immigration violator beyond the
time normally authorized, raising the same “prolonged detention”
concern presented by Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 and discussed in the
Arizona opinions. Because the regulation contains neither a warrant
requirement348 nor a probable cause requirement, the same Fourth
Amendment concerns are present as were discussed in Arizona.
The absence of a probable cause requirement routinely appears
to result in warrantless investigatory arrests pursuant to immigration
detainers. ICE typically lodges a detainer against a suspected
immigration violator by faxing the Form I-247 detainer to the prison
or jail. The Form I-247 detainer has a set of boxes, which ICE
officials can check to indicate ICE’s level of prior investigation and
interest.349 For years, the boxes were:
( ) Investigation has been initiated to determine whether this
person is subject to removal from the United States.
( ) A Notice to Appear or other charging document
initiating removal proceedings, a copy of which is attached,
was served on ___(date)___
347. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Supreme Court’s
Ruling on Arizona v. United States (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-s-ruling-arizona-v-united-states; see
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status
would raise constitutional concerns.”).
348. It cannot be argued that the detainer is equivalent to a warrant. See supra note 309 and
accompanying text.
349. Form I-247, October 2011 (on file with the author).
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( ) A warrant of arrest in removal proceedings, a copy of
which is attached, was served on ___(date)___
( ) Deportation or removal from the United States has been
ordered.350
The available evidence suggests that many, if not most,
detainers are issued based only on “investigation initiated” and not
on the basis of a Notice to Appear, warrant, or prior order.351 ICE has
been criticized for “poor targeting of government removal efforts,”352
suggesting that the amount of investigation prior to the issuance of a
detainer may be minimal. Additionally, critics have suggested the
databases on which ICE relies are of questionable accuracy. 353 Thus,
the Fourth Amendment concerns behind a detainer issued based only
on “investigation initiated” may be substantial.354 Indeed, even if one

350. Id. In December 2012, perhaps responding to the Arizona decision and Fourth
Amendment concerns, DHS issued anew detainer guidance and a revised Form I-247. For a
complete discussion of the December 2012 revisions, see Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting
Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 281, 302-05 (2013).
351. Lasch, supra note 21, at 173−82.
352. ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRACIMMIGRATION (Nov. 9, 2010), http://trac
.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/ (documenting DHS’s rising failure rate in immigration
proceedings).
353. Ajmel Quereshi, Hope for Change in Immigration Policy: Recommendations for the
Obama Administration, 16 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19, 22−23 (2009).
354. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601–05 (1975) (holding arrest for purposes of
investigation violated Fourth Amendment). The December 2012 detainer guidance states that
immigration officials “should” place a detainer only where there is “reason to believe” an
individual is subject to removal and additional conditions are present. Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special
Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Guidance on the Use
of Detainers in the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Criminal Justice Systems 2 (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf. But this guidance cannot
eliminate this substantial Fourth Amendment concern. First, the guidance is expressed not as a
legal position of DHS but as an enforcement priority. The guidance contains an express
disclaimer stating the guidance does not “limit the legal authority of ICE or its personnel” and
does not “create any right . . . enforceable at law by any party.” Id. at 3. The guidance also
excludes U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) from its ambit, further emphasizing the
document’s function as an enforcement priority policy position as opposed to a legal position.
The guidance also calls for a six-month review, whereupon “ICE will consider whether
modifications, if any, are needed.” Id. There is no guarantee, in other words, that ICE will not
return to its practice, prevailing over the thirty years prior to the revised guidance, of issuing
detainers upon nothing more than an initiated investigation into whether an individual is subject
to removal. The detainer regulation, after all, does not require “reason to believe” or any other
level of suspicion prior to issuing a detainer. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012).
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of the other three boxes on the detainer form is checked, probable
cause may yet be lacking.355
An additional Fourth Amendment concern arises from the
detainer regulation’s command that the state or local agency with
custody over the suspected immigration violator “shall maintain
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of
custody by the Department.”356 This command runs directly counter
to the Court’s declaration that the Fourth Amendment requires any
person subjected to a warrantless arrest be brought before a neutral
magistrate for a probable cause determination within forty-eight
hours—including weekends and holidays—absent a showing of
extraordinary circumstances.357 The immigration detainer regulation
thus violates the Fourth Amendment in two ways.358 First, a prisoner
may be detained for longer than forty-eight hours (indeed, up to five
days on a holiday weekend) without appearing for a probable cause
determination.359 Second, the regulation includes no mandatory
appearance before a neutral magistrate.360
2. The Detainer Regulation Raises Substantial Tenth Amendment
Problems
Although questions of federal commandeering of state officials
were not present with respect to S.B. 1070, such Tenth Amendment
concerns do attend immigration detainers and are worthy of a brief
discussion here. There has been considerable debate and confusion
over whether immigration detainers act as a federal request or as a
command to state or local officials.361 The regulation itself purports
355. Compare supra note 309 (discussing absence of probable cause requirement in INA
§ 236(a), the statute authorizing administrative arrest warrants in immigration proceedings), with
Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (indicating that the Notice to
Appear must specify the “acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law”).
356. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012).
357. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56−57 (1991).
358. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See MANUEL, supra note 297, at 11–14 (detailing authorities supporting the position that
the detainer is a request and authorities supporting the position that the detainer is a command);
Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012)
(holding that use of “shall” in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state
officials).
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to command state and local law enforcement agencies receiving an
immigration detainer to continue holding the target of the detainer in
custody.362 This raises the question of whether the claimed
compulsion of state officials by the federal government violates the
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the States.
Modern jurisprudence suggests an affirmative answer to this
question, for the Court has spoken with abundant clarity in Printz v.
United States.363 In Printz, the Court struck down, in no uncertain
terms, a federal statute requiring local law-enforcement officers to
submit prospective handgun-purchaser background-check requests to
the federal government: “Today we hold that Congress cannot . . .
conscript[] the States’ officers directly. . . . [S]uch commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.”364
In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to history and
recounted a particularly compelling analogue to today’s detainer
regulation. The First Congress enacted a law aimed at holding
federal prisoners in state jails.365 The Court found it significant that
the statute “issued not a command to the States’ executive, but a
recommendation to their legislatures.”366 Rather than passing
legislation compelling the states to house federal prisoners, Congress
“‘recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws,
making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their goals, to receive
and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of
the United States,’ and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each
prisoner.”367 When one state failed to comply, “Congress’s only
reaction was a law authorizing the marshal in any State that failed to

362. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012).
363. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
364. Id. at 935. In a separate article I trace the history of the Tenth Amendment across the
issues of fugitive slave rendition and fugitive criminal rendition, demonstrating the persistence of
Tenth Amendment issues in rendition and the use of the Tenth Amendment as a means of civil
rights resistance to rendition. Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance: Civil Rights
Opposition to the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves, Interstate Criminals, and Suspected Immigration
Violators, Section III.B (Nov. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) (selected for presentation at the 2013 annual conference of the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) by the Immigration and Civil Rights sections of the AALS).
365. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909; Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96.
366. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909.
367. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96 (1789)).
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comply with the Recommendation of September 23, 1789, to rent a
temporary jail until provision for a permanent one could be made.”368
As discussed above, Congress appears to have taken care to
avoid Tenth Amendment issues in its crafting of the detainer statute.
Either Section 287(d) ought to be read as not requiring prolonged
detention at all, or it ought to be read as permitting federal officials
to issue an immigration detainer to state and local officials only upon
their request in the first instance.369 Had Congress written INA
§ 287(d) to require (rather than permit) local law enforcement
officials to report controlled substance arrestees suspected of being
immigration violators and to require (rather than permit) those local
officials to request immigration officials to “determine promptly
whether or not to issue a detainer,”370 the facts would be virtually
indistinguishable from Printz.
But while Congress carefully crafted the detainer statute to
avoid Tenth Amendment problems,371 the same cannot be said of the
immigration detainer regulation, which does purport to compel state
officials to enforce its provisions.372 The holding of Printz and the
example cited by the Court showing the lack of federal power to
compel state jailers to hold federal prisoners demonstrate that the
detainer regulation exceeds federal authority to compel state officials
to act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court proceeded cautiously in Arizona, nimbly sidestepping
the hot-button issues that have dominated the political debate which
gave birth to the case: racial profiling in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, prolonged detention in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and the question of whether the states have “inherent
368. Id. at 910 (citing Resolution of Mar. 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 225).
369. See supra Part III.B; Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(d)(3), 66 Stat. 233 (1952)
(codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(3) (2006)).
370. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(d), 66 Stat. 233 (codified as amended
8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006)) (permitting state officials to initiate action), with Pub. L. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (Nov. 30, 1993) (portion of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act struck down in
Printz) (requiring state officials to initiate action).
371. Congress left control in the hands of local law enforcement officials to decide for
themselves when to bring a controlled substance arrestee to the attention of federal immigration
officials, ensuring INA § 287(d) avoided any Tenth Amendment unfunded mandate problems.
372. 8 C.F.R § 287.7(d) (2012).
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authority” to police immigration. Nonetheless, the Arizona opinion
represents a strong accretion of federal authority over immigration
enforcement, striking down three of the contested provisions and
leaving the fourth denuded of whatever new state police power
Arizona had attempted to breathe into the provision.
The Court was clear in its pronouncement: the states may not
enforce civil immigration law except as explicitly authorized by
Congress—to do so would be “not the system Congress created.”373
But while generally providing a ringing endorsement of federal
power, Arizona also contains the seeds of a challenge to the
unbridled power of the federal executive branch to pursue
immigration enforcement objectives. The executive branch, like the
states, has an obligation to implement “the system Congress created”
and none other. The Arizona opinion leaves little doubt that the
detainer regulation, by which immigration officials may issue a
command to state officials to detain prisoners who would otherwise
be freed, upon no basis other than that “investigation has been
initiated,” is “not the system Congress created.” The detainer
regulation also raises substantial constitutional questions, including
the Fourth Amendment issue raised by prolonged detention—the
precise concern raised by the Justices concerning implementation of
the “show me your papers” provision of S.B. 1070. It is clear that
detention, as envisioned by the detainer regulation, must comply
with the Fourth Amendment; it must be supported by probable cause
and meet the Riverside requirement of prompt neutral review.374
While beyond the scope of this Article, Arizona also poses
questions for state and local law enforcement officials who might
consider holding a prisoner pursuant to an immigration detainer. First
is the question of whether state police power can justify such
detention. If, as I suggest, the detainer cannot serve as legal
authorization for prolonging detention, state and local officials must
derive the authority elsewhere—the police power being the natural
choice. Arizona leaves open the question of whether state officials

373. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
374. This Article has examined only the impact Arizona has upon the validity of the federal
detainer regulation. An analysis of how state and local officials are impacted by Arizona is
beyond the scope of the Article. But it is likely that given the absence of federal authority in
support of detainers, state officials will be hard pressed to justify prolonged detention.
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have any authority to pursue immigration enforcement—either civil
or criminal—as a matter of the state police power. Arizona also
leaves open the possibility that, in the case of criminal enforcement,
whatever state police power exists to support detention may in fact
be preempted by federal law.
A second question state and local officials must answer is
whether prolonged detention can be accomplished consistently with
the Fourth Amendment. Arizona makes clear that prolonged
detention raises Fourth Amendment concerns, but does not answer
any of the specific questions raised by the prolonged detention of a
suspected immigration violator on the basis of what little information
is contained in the standard immigration detainer form.
Arizona answers some questions clearly and leaves others
unanswered. Given the Court’s narrow focus and avoidance of the
larger questions raised by the case, the decision likely will do little to
stem the tide of state immigration enforcement measures and their
accompanying legal challenges, as states seek to discover the limits
of what the Court held to be their unpreempted power. Nor will
Arizona end the civil rights debates that will continue to accompany
immigration enforcement efforts on both the federal and state level.
The battles continue in Arizona. Just weeks after the Court
declined to strike down Section 2(B), advocacy groups sought once
again to enjoin Arizona from implementing that provision.375 The
district court held it was bound by Arizona to allow the provision to
take effect,376 and enforcement began on September 18, 2012. The
Ninth Circuit declined to grant an emergency injunction halting
enforcement, but Arizona’s governor said she was under “no
illusion” that an end to the litigation was foreseeable.377

375. Mariano Castillo, Civil Rights Groups Seek New Injunction Against Arizona Immigration
Law, CNN, (July 18, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-18/us/us_arizona-immigrationchallenge_1_omar-jadwat-immigration-law-local-arizona-police.
376. Fernanda Santos, Arizona Immigration Law Survives Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012,
at A21.
377. “Show Your Papers” Arizona Immigration Provision Survives as Court Rejects Bid to
Have It Blocked, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 25, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/09/26/show-your-papers-arizona_n_1914678.html.

